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]PROPERTY AS A NATURAL INSTITUTION:
THE SEPARATION OF PROPERTY FROM
SOVEREIGNTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
L. BENJAMIN EDERINGTON"
An independent individual, whether he been driven from his country, or
has legally quitted it of his own accord, may settle in a country which he
finds without an owner, and there possess an independent domain. Who-
ever would afterwards make himself master of the entire country, could
not do it with justice without respecting the rights and independence of
this person.
-EMMERICH VATrE, THE LAW OFNATIONS bk. 2, ch. 7, § 96, at 170 (1797).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Private property has always enjoyed a unique sanctity under mod-
em international law. Unlike other "human rights," which have re-
ceived tentative and hesitant protection, both customary and conven-
tional international practice have repeatedly asserted the sanctity of
private property.
This particularly has been the case since the end of the Cold War
and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. For example, in November
1990, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
(CSCE) adopted the Charter of Paris, which designates the right "to
own property... and to exercise individual enterprise" as one of the
most fundamental of human rights.' This concern with private prop-
erty rights, however, is hardly unique to the 1990s.
In fact, the protection of private property from state interference
has been one of the most pronounced themes throughout the history
of modem international law since its inception in the seventeenth
century. One could even argue, in light of the emphasis that early
international publicists such as Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf
placed on safeguarding private property from the ravages of war, that
modem international law developed for the express purpose of pro-
1. Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Nov. 21, 1990, 30 1.L.M 190, 194
(1991). Such an unconditional pronouncement was unimaginable during most of
this century when international law, influenced by modem Statist ideologies,
qualified that an individual's right to private property "shall not, however, in any
way impair the right of a State to ... control the use of property in accordance
with the general interest." Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 1, 213 U.N.T.S. 262.
Elaborate legal structures created to resolve property disputes in the aftermath
of both the Bosnian and Gulf Wars provide recent evidence of this concern with
private property rights. See, e.g., General Framework Agreement for Peace in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 75; Report of the Secretary-
General Pursuant to Paragraph 19 of Security Council Resolution 687, May 2,
1991, 30 I.L.M. 1706 (establishing the United Nations Compensation Committee).
[13:263
PROPERTYASA NATURAL INSTITUTION
tecting private property rights from state interference.
This article will consider three analogous bodies of law which re-
flect this general respect afforded private property under international
law: the recognition of private property in terra nullius, the preser-
vation of property rights after changes in sovereignty, and the pro-
tection of property rights during military occupation.2
All three fields embody a common theme-that property rights are
fundamentally independent of state sovereignty and, hence, changes
in (or even the complete absence of) sovereignty or government do
not affect them. The recognition of property rights in terra nullius
(i.e., land that belongs to no state) is the paradigmatic example of this
idea. A few contemporary commentators-imbued with the modem
image of property as the creation of municipal law-question the
ability of private parties to establish property rights in terra nullius.3
Despite the absence of a state sovereign to give legal sanction to
these rights, customary practice nonetheless has repeatedly recog-
2. See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 19 of Security
Council Resolution 687, supra note 1. See generally Case Concerning the Factory
at Chorz6w, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17 (Sept. 13); 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 317-18 & n.l (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 6th ed.
1947) (providing extensive citation to principal cases and treatises on the subject);
8 MARJORIE WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 25, at 1020-185
(1967). Another example-probably more familiar to most readers-of the general
respect afforded private property under international law is the set of rules re-
stricting a state's ability to expropriate property held by foreign nationals, in par-
ticular, the obligation to provide compensation. Of course, as international law has
expanded beyond its Western juridical foundations, non-Western developing
countries, in particular, have heavily criticized this rule. See, e.g., Brice M. Clagett
& Daniel B. Poneman, The Treatment of Economic Injury to Aliens in the Revised
Restatement of Foreign Relations Lav, 22 INT'L LAW. 35 (1988) (recounting the
internal debates within the American Law Institute on this issue).
Yet another (more obscure) illustration of the privileged status of private
property involves the doctrine of prescriptive title. At least one scholar has argued
that concern for the protection of vested private property rights motivated the for-
mation of this doctrine. See MARK F. LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND
GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 179 (1926)
("Ce principe trouve une application toute particuli~re lorsq'il s'agit d'intdrets
privds, qui, une fois mis en souffrance, ne sauraient etre sauvegardds d'une
manire efficace m6me par des sacrifices quelconques de l'ltat auquel appartien-
nent les intdress6s.") (quoting Norway-Sweden Maritime Boundary Arbitration,
102 S.P. 947 (1909)).
3. See, e.g., 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 2, at 507; LAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 164-65 (1966).
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nized private property rights in terra nullius.
The laws governing both state succession and military occupation
evince the same conviction that private property is fundamentally
distinct from state sovereignty. Thus, among the rather murky body
of rules governing state succession, the only doctrine that states have
consistently recognized as legally obligatory is the doctrine of ac-
quired rights. This doctrine states that although "[t]he people change
their allegiance [and] their relation to their ancient sovereign is dis-
solved[,] their relations to each other, and their rights of property,
remain undisturbed." 4 Similarly, the rules governing military occu-
pation mandate that, although an occupant may exercise some of the
sovereign powers of the conquered state, "[i]mmovable private en-
emy property may under no circumstances or conditions be appropri-
ated." 5
The common theme of these three bodies of law-divorcing the
right to property from state sovereignty-reflects the influence of a
powerful theory of property in Western jurisprudence: the "natural
right" image of property as a pre-political, natural institution.
A. PROPERTY AS A NATURAL INSTITUTION
As the epigraph from Emmerich Vattel's classic treatise, The Law
of Nations,6 illustrates, international law historically has been in-
clined to this notion of private property as a fundamental, primeval
institution that exists independent of state sovereignty. According to
this theory, the state does not create property rights. Rather, the state,
itself, is a creation, formed to preserve pre-existing property rights.
This natural right theory of property has been one of the most influ-
ential views of property in Western legal jurisprudence.7
John Locke is one of the most influential exponents of this theory.
4. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 87 (1833).
5. 2 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 403 (Hersch
Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1948).
6. Emmerich Vattel, The Law of Nations (1797).
7. See generally RICHARD SCHLATrER, PRIVATE PROPERTY: THE HISTORY OF
AN IDEA (1951) (providing an interesting history of various theories of private
property in Western political philosophy); LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY
RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS (1977); ALAN CARTER, THE PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (1989); C.B. MACPHERSON, PROPERTY,
MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL POSITIONS (1978).
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His conceptualization presents property as a natural, pre-political in-
stitution that the individual creates through the investment of labour:
[E]very Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any
Right to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands,
we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the
State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour
with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his
Property."
"Thus Labour," and not the state or the law, "in the Beginning, gave
a Right of Property." 9
The state, by contrast, is not grounded in nature. It is formed by
the agreements of man. Because property in the state of nature is in-
secure, people unite to form a government whose principal purpose is
to protect their property rights.'0 The result, according to Locke, is
that property is immune to governmental interference. "The Supream
Power cannot take from any Man any part of his Property without
his own consent. For the preservation of Property being the end of
Government, and that for which Men enter into Society, it necessar-
ily supposes and requires, that the People should have Property." I
The essence of Locke's theory, therefore, is to divorce the right to
property from the state. By asserting that "property is natural, that
the right to property is a natural right, and that private ownership is
an institution, not of man, but of nature," Locke insulates property
rights from changes in the state.' 2 "Political institutions, founded on
the artificial agreements and conventions of men, may be remade
8. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT bk. 2, ch. 5, § 27, at 305-
06 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2d ed. 1960) (1690).
9. Id bk. 2, ch. 5, § 45, at 317; see also id bk. 2, ch. 5, § 30, at 307
(" [A]mongst those who are counted the Civiliz'd part of Mankind, who have made
and multiplied positive Laws to determine property, this original Law of Nature
for the beginning of Property . . . still takes place.").
10. See ia bk. 2, ch. 7, § 88, at 342-43.
11. Id bk. 2, ch. 11,§ 138, at378.
12. SCHLATTER, supra note 7, at 152; see also David Schultz, Political Theory
and Legal History: Conflicting Depictions of Property in the American Political
Founding, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 464, 472 (1993) ("Property is a natural and pre-
political institution given to man by God, and a property interest gives the owner a
singular and absolute control over something which no one, including the state,
could violate.") (citing Gerald E. Aylmer, The Meaning and Definition of "Prop-
erty" in Seventeenth Century England, 86 PAST & PRESENT 93-95 (1980)).
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whenever the contracting parties so will; property institutions,
founded on nature, are as unalterable as the structure of the uni-
verse." 13
Although Locke's notion of property has exerted tremendous in-
fluence in the Anglo-American legal tradition, 4 this fundamental
notion of property is hardly unique to Locke or that legal tradition.
Nineteenth-century British publicist John Westlake observed that the
theory of a state of nature-with its related notion that property pre-
exists the formation of governments, and is therefore more funda-
mental than the state-influenced both the continent and the British
Isles during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the gestational
period of modem international law.15
Hugo Grotius, the purported father of modem international law,
suggested in his magnus opus, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, that the " in-
troduction of property ownership" preceded that of government and
law, occurring during a state of nature, a state that "preceded all civil
law." 6 Similarly, German publicist Samuel Pufendorf, in De Jure
13. SCHLATTER, supra note 7, at 152.
14. See, e.g., Edward S. Corwin, The Debt of American Constitutional Law to
Natural Concepts, 25 NOTRE DAME LAW. 258 (1950); Carol M. Rose, Possession
as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73 (1985); Schultz, supra note 12, at
471 & n.50, 472-75; Jeffrey Riedinger, Property Rights and Democracy: Philo-
sophical and Economic Considerations, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 893, 897-98 (1993).
William Blackstone's famous COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, which
often invokes Locke's theories and, in general, expresses similar views of prop-
erty, evocatively demonstrates Locke's influence on Anglo-American jurispru-
dence. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
ch. 1, 26 (William Draper Lewis ed., Rees Welsh & Co., 1977) (1900).
15. See JOHN WESTLAKE, CHAPTERS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 11 (1894) (" [I]t was in the age when international law was being formed that
a theory, by no means confined to that age, attained its fullest development and
currency. I mean the theory of a state of nature ...."); see also id. at 164-65 ("It
squared with fashionable theory, comparing the acquisition of uncivilised regions
to the acts of men living without government in a supposed state of nature ....");
HENRY STEINER & DETLEV VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 480 (3d
ed. 1986).
16. HuGO GROTIUs, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES bk. 2, ch. 8, § 1, at
295 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., Clarendon Press 1925; see also id, ch. 1, § 7, at 40
(" [T]he right to use force in obtaining one's own existed before laws were prom-
ulgated.").
John Westlake described the essence of Grotius' legal thought as a conviction
that
Certain institutions exist among all men... and are consonant with reason .... They
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Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo, 7 articulated a perspective of property
that Locke later echoed-that "proprietorship and dominion belong
to natural law,"'" and that the intrinsic "obligation to observe the
[natural] law of abstaining from what is another's is coeval with
mankind,"19 existing even in the absence of a legal regime to protect
such rights. "For surely it is as plain as day, despite what is said to
the contrary by Hobbes, that those who live outside of states can
have something which is their own." 2
The natural rights doctrine equally influenced eighteenth century
jurists. Like Emmerich Vattel, both his contemporary Jean Jacques
Burlamaqui and German publicist Christian Wolff ascribed to the
theory that "the property of individuals is prior to the formation of
states."'" In a passage quite similar to Vattel's, Wolff posits that
when "families dwelling in the same territory unite into a state ....
The ownership of the estates always remains distinct from the sover-
eignty, nor does the sovereignty affect the ownership in any way.
Thus, Locke's notion of property as a natural institution was merely
a refinement of a theory that enjoyed broad currency throughout
are examples of distributive justice, even if neither history nor any fair presumption to
be made about prehistoric times enables us to refer their beginning to a conscious ex-
ercise of such justice. Among these are property, with binding contract as its necessary
adjunct...."
WESTLAKE, supra note 15, at 43.
17. 2 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIuM LIBRI OCTO, bk. 4,
ch. 4, § 14 (Oldfather trans. 1934).
18. Id at 555 (Oldfather trans., 1934) (emphasis added).
19. Id at 556.
20. Id bk. 7, ch. 5, § 2, at 1276 (citation omitted). Of course, like Locke, Pu-
fendorf realized that such primitive property rights were insecure, and therefore,
the State was formed to give more protection to these rights. See id at 1277
(quoting CICERO, ON DUTIES, bk. 2, ch. 21) ("Commonwealths were established
principally for this cause, that men should hold what was their own. For although
mankind was congregated together by the guidance of nature, yet it was with the
hope of preserving their own property that they sought the protection of cities.").
21. 2 J.J. BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AND POLMC LAW pt. 3,
ch. 5, at 144 (Thomas Nugent trans., 5th ed., 1807); see CHRISTIAN WOLFF, JUS
GENTiuM METHODO SCIENTIFICA PERTRACTATUM ch. 1, §§ 86-87, at 50-51 (Drake
trans. 1934).
The natural law tradition-with its consonant notion that property pre-existed
the state-particularly influenced German legal scholars. See generally OTTO
GIERKE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF SOCIETY: 1500 TO 1800 (Ernest
Barker trans., 1st ed. 2d prtg. 1960) (discussing political theories of the modem
age).
22. WOLFF, supra note 2 1, ch. 1, § 86, at 50-51.
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Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Because of its prevalence during these centuries (not to mention its
continued popularity in the legal systems of most developed coun-
tries), this Lockean, or natural rights, theory of property exerted a
tremendous influence on international law. As late as 1884, promi-
nent jurists, such as Sir Travers Twiss, explicitly referenced the natu-
ral foundation of property in their discussions of international law:
There thus arises an obligation of Natural Law to refrain from disturbing
a party who is in possession of a thing .... The first rule is, that a person
may take possession of a thing which has no owner, so as to acquire
Rightful Possession of it; and Property is in such a case acquired simulta-
neously with Possession .... Such being the Law of Nature in regard to
primitive acquisition on the part of individuals, the Law of Nations is in
perfect accord with it.23
Such occasional references to natural law or rights, nevertheless,
fail to reflect the real influence of the natural rights theory of prop-
erty. The numerous doctrines that incorporate its general thesis reveal
its subtle but lasting legacy. International law's adoption of the prin-
ciple declared by Christian Wolff in 1740 that "the ownership of the
estates always remain distinct from the sovereignty, nor does the
sovereignty affect the ownership in any way,"24 manifests this leg-
acy.
B. PROPERTY AS A CREATION OF THE STATE
Other theories helped shape Western legal jurisprudence along
with the Lockean notion of property. A second, anti-podal tradition
runs throughout modem international law. In contrast to the evoca-
23. SIR TRAVERS Twiss, THE LAW OF NATIONS §§ 115-16, at 194-95 (1884);
see also J.B. MARTENS FERRAO, L'AFRIQUE: LA QUESTION SOULEVtE
DERNItREMENT ENTRE L'ANGLETERRE ET LE PORTUGAL 6 (1890).
Explicit reference to the natural rights theory of property was not limited to
treatises. Diplomatic practice during the nineteenth century also often recognized
this theory. For example, in negotiations between the United States and Great Brit-
ain in 1826 over boundary disputes, the American plenipotentiary declared that
"[i]t may be admitted, as an abstract principle, that, in the origin of Society, first
occupancy and cultivation were the foundation of the rights of private property
and of National Sovereignty." Message of President Adams to Congress (Dec. 28,
1827), quoted in TWISS, supra, § 122, at 202.
24. WOLFF, supra note 21, ch. 1, § 86, at 51.
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five imagery of a state of nature, exponents of this conflicting tradi-
tion often ground their perspective of property on an equally power-
ful postulate. Proponents of this tradition posit that, as Aristotle
claimed, "man is by nature a political animal"' and, therefore, re-
sides within the context of political society. Others, recognizing a
pre-political state of nature, agree with Thomas Hobbes's assertion
that because life in such a state would be "nasty, brutish and
short," 26 any notion of property must exist within the protecting con-
fines of the State. As a result, this tradition views property as the
creation of society and convention. To its proponents, the notion that
property can exist outside of law is ludicrous. Jeremy Bentham's
statement represents a paradigmatic expression of this tradition:
"T]here is no such thing as natural property . . . it is entirely the
work of law .... Property and law are born together, and die to-
gether. Before laws were made there was no property; take away
laws, and property ceases."27
Bentham's powerful critique of the natural rights theory of prop-
erty in many ways merely revived an older view in Western philoso-
25. 1 ARISTOTLE, POLITICA ch. 2, reprinted in THE BASIC WORKS OF
ARISTOTLE 1129 (Richard McKeon ed. & Benjamin Jonett trans., 1941).
26. THOMAS HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN ch. 13, at 84 (J.C.A. Gaskin ed., Oxford
Univ. Press, 1996).
27. JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 111-13 (C.K. Ogden & Rich-
ard Hildreth trans., Harcourt Press 1931); see also 3 THE WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM 221 (John Bowring pub., 1862) ("Rights are ... the fruits of the law,
and of the law alone. There are no rights without law-no rights contrary to law-
no rights anterior to the law.").
Interestingly, the Conservatives, usually antagonistic toward Utilitarian phi-
losophies, shared the Utilitarian criticisms of the Lockean natural right to property.
See generally RUSSELL KIRK, THE CONSERVATIVE MIND: FROM BURKE TO
SANTANAYA (7th ed. 1995) (providing a general introduction to Conservatism and
its proponents). See, e.g., EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN
FRANCE 219-21 (1790); SIR HENRY SUMNER MAINE, VILLAGE COMMUNITIES OF
THE EAST AND WEST 230 (3d ed. 1913) ("Nobody is at liberty to attack several
property and to say at the same time that he values civilization. The history of the
two cannot be disentangled.").
The German Idealists, Bentham's contemporaries, expressed similar notions on
the Continent. Hegel, in particular, with his emphasis on the organic state, argued
"that individual rights of property do not hold good against the commands of the
state [being] always subject to the 'higher spheres of right,' to a corporate body,
e.g., or to the state." SCHLATrER, supra note 7, at 257 (quoting FRIEDRICH HEGEL,
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 214 (T.M. Knox trans., Clarendon Press 1942); see also
IMMANUEL KANT, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 79 (William Hastie trans., 1887).
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phy of property as the creation of the state. The Roman jurists,
Cicero and Seneca, for example, both suggested that property could
exist only within the context of the state.28 Similarly, both medieval
Christian theology and its companion feudal notion of territory as the
personal property of the prince considered "the division and appro-
priation of property [to] procee[d] from human law."29
Other famous exponents of this tradition include Hobbes, who as-
serted that "[a]ll private estates of land proceed originally from the
arbitrary distribution of the sovereign,""0 In addition, Rousseau ar-
gued that private property and civil society are synonymous. Both
simultaneously come into existence the moment that the "first man,
who after enclosing a piece of ground, took it into his head to say,
this is mine, and found people simple enough to believe him." 3
Scottish philosopher David Hume also viewed property as a man-
made concept. To Hume,
property is nothing but those goods, whose constant possession is estab-
lish 'd by the laws of society; that is, by the laws of justice .... Tis very
preposterous, therefore, to imagine, that we can have any idea of prop-
erty, without fully comprehending the nature of justice, and shewing its
28. See, e.g., CICERO, FOR CAECINA, quoted in PuFENDORF, supra note 18, bk.
8, ch. 5, § 2, at 1276-77.
29. 2 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE ch. 57, § 2 (Timothy
McDermott ed., 1989); see also WESTLAKE, supra note 15, at 131-32.
30. HOBBES, supra note 26, ch. 24, at 164; see also id, ch. 18, at 119 (stating
"annexed to the sovereignty, the whole power of prescribing the Rules, whereby
every man may know, what goods he may enjoy ... without being molested by
any of his fellow subjects: and this is it men call propriety.").
James Harrington, a contemporary of Hobbes and Locke, also challenged the
idea that property was a natural institution. He, like Hobbes, viewed property as a
convention of the state, which could be altered by the sovereign to promote the
common good. See THE POLITICAL WORKS OF JAMES HARRINGTON 405 (J.G.A.
Pocock ed., 1977).
31. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of
Inequality Among Men, reprinted in JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT AND DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN OF INEQUALITY 211 (Lester G. Crocker
ed., 1967) [hereinafter SOCIAL CONTRACT]. Unlike Grotius, Locke, and Hobbes,
Rousseau viewed the creation of the state (through that first act of recognizing pri-
vate property) as an evil act that destroyed an idyllic state of nature in which all
men were equal. Rousseau therefore believed that the creation of private property
is the source of all inequality between men and the inspiration for his famous
statement: "Man was born free, and everywhere he is in chains." Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, The Social Contract, reprinted in SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra, at 7.
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origin in the artifice and contrivance of man. 2
This conventional or positivistic conception of property as a social
institution, an artifact of human invention, has become the dominant
theory of property in contemporary society. Domestic law reflects
this theory in the notion of eminent domain and the conviction that
the state possesses the ultimate power to rearrange property rights for
the public good. International law reveals this influence in the wide-
spread acceptance of the congruous idea that:
A State enjoys an exclusive right to regulate matters pertaining to the
ownership of property of every kind which may be said to belong within
its territory. Thus it may determine not only the processes by which title
may be acquired, retained or transferred, but also what individuals are to
be permitted to enjoy privileges of ownership.3
This positivist, state-oriented view of property found its most
powerful exposition in the 1970s. During this period, most develop-
ing states challenged the customary international rules that protect
foreign-owned property through such vehicles as the 1974 Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States.' In particular, states ques-
tioned the rule that a state must provide compensation for expropri-
ating property owned by foreign nationals.35
Despite the general triumph of this positivistic notion of property
in both municipal and international law, international practice, nev-
ertheless, continues to afford extensive protections to private prop-
erty from government intrusion, illustrating the continued influence
32. 3 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE pt. 2, § 2, at 491 (L.A.
Selby-Bigge ed., 1958) (emphasis added); see also DAVID HuME, ESSAYS:
MORAL, POLITICAL AND LITERARY 190 (T.H. Green & T.H. Grose eds., 1875)
("All questions of property are subordinate to authority of civil laws . . . ");
JOSEPH PRIESTLEY, ESSAY ON THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT 41 (2d. ed.
1771) (" [N]othing is properly a man's own, but what general rules, which have for
their object the good of the whole, give to him.").
33. 1 Charles Hyde, International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by
the United States 650 (2d rev. ed. 1947).
34. United Nations Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res.
3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. A19631 (1974).
35. See id; see generally John King Gamble, Jr. & Maria Frankowska, Inter-
national Law's Response to the New International Economic Order: An Overview,
9 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 257 (1986) (examining the international legal as-
pects of the new international economic order).
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of the natural rights image of property. Vestiges of this venerable
theory emerge in doctrines addressing the status of private property
in territories of questionable sovereignty: the recognition of property
rights in terra nullius, the preservation of vested rights during state
succession, and the protection of property during military occupa-
tion. At the same time, these three bodies of law also often reflect the
influence of the more modem, positivistic image of property as a
creation of the state. Consequently, consideration of the three doc-
trines will illuminate the continued tension in international law be-
tween two competing images of property: property as a natural in-
stitution and property as a state-constructed artifact. 6
II. TERRA NULLIUS
One of the most interesting questions in international law concerns
an individual's claim to property in a territory that no country has
previously claimed (i.e., terra nullius) but that a state has suddenly
annexed.37 To conceptualize this issue, imagine a small reef in the
36. Before turning to the corpus of this paper, a brief comment on sources is in
order. Although this paper has sought multinational evidence for its discussions,
even a brief survey of the footnotes will show a considerable majority of the
sources are English-based. This was not intentional. Instead, it was a result of the
simple fact that, for whatever reason-perhaps because of the particular sanctity of
private property in the Anglo-American juridical and social consciousness-those
countries which have inherited the English common law, the United States in par-
ticular, have been, as several commentators have observed, the most emphatic de-
fenders of private property rights under international law. See e.g. Francis Sayre,
Change of Sovereignty and Private Ownership of Land, 12 AM. J. INT'L L. 475,
479 & n.6 (1918) (stating that the United States has been selected for this exami-
nation, in part because its decisions carry influence, but primarily because United
States law contains more precedents and decisions upon the subject than the law of
any other country); D. P. O'CONNELL, THE LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION 79-80
(1956) [hereinafter O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION] (stating that the doctrine of
respect for land tenure has been upheld in a long series of American cases);
ARTHUR B. KEITH, THE THEORY OF STATE SUCCESSION 78 (1907) ("The United
States is peculiarly rich in judicial and other dicta on this head."); WESTLAKE, su-
pra note 15, at 246 (" [T]he leaning of writers in England and the United States is
towards greater mildness than seems to prevail on the continent .... ).
37. Albeit a fascinating topic, this article does not address attempts by private
individuals and corporations to create independent states, like the ill-fated SeaLand
or the legacy of Sir James Brooke as the Rajah of Sarawak. See Samuel P. Mene-
fee, "Republics of the Reefs:" Nation-Building on the Continental Shelf and in the
World's Oceans, 25 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 81 (1994); 1 DANIEL P. O'CONNELL,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 480-81 (2d ed. 1965) [hereinafter O'CONNELL,
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South Pacific. Assume no country has claimed the reef as part of its
territory and that it lies outside the 12-mile maritime boundary of any
state.3" In other words, the reef is terra nullius-land that literally
belongs to no country. Now, assume a private individual or company
discovers the reef and decides it would make a great location for a
small hotel or the foundation for a mining rig. Finally, imagine the
individual or company succeeds in its endeavor, and a country (of
which the private party is not a national) learns of this success and
asserts sovereignty over the reef.
What are the rights of the private party? Does the new sovereign
have to respect the party's claim to the reef? Can the new sovereign
eject the party from the reef and transfer ownership to one of its own
nationals without compensating the party?
Most contemporary treatises on international law fail to address
these questions. Two of the principal English-language treatises
contain only brief allusions to this subject, and both discussions are
confusing. This confusion results, in part, from the strain in modem
international law between the two conceptualizations of property
outlined above: the Lockean natural notion of property as antecedent
to the state and the conventional positivistic notion of property as a
creation of the state.
A. TREATISES AND DICTA
The classic treatise on international law, Oppenheim's Interna-
INTERNATIONAL LAW]; 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 2, at 496-97; LINDLEY, supra
note 2, at 84-90, 91-113 (1926). In a similar vein, this discussion does not discuss
the significant role of private parties as the indicia of occupation that states have
relied upon to support their claims to terra nullius. See generally ARTHUR KELLER
ET AL., CREATION OF RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH SYM1BOLIC ACTS: 1400-
1800 (1938); O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra, at 480-83; LINDLEY, sui-
pra note 2, at 284-91; BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 134-35; 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM,
OPPENHEMI'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 678 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th
ed. 1992); LINDLEY, supra note 2, at 91-109 (providing a fascinating discussion of
the role of the great trading corporations, such as the British and Dutch East India
Companies).
38. For those concerned with the qualification of the reef as an "island" under
the Law of the Sea Convention of 1982, assume that the reef has grown above the
water line so that a portion is exposed even at high tide. See Third United Nations
Convention of the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 621122, 21 I.L.M. 1245
(1982).
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tional Law,39 illustrates the tensions between these two conceptions.
Several passages in the treatise indicate a modem, positivistic disbe-
lief that property rights can be created outside of a state's sover-
eignty. For example, Oppenheim states that "occupation can only
take place by and for a State; it must be a State act, that is, it must be
performed in the service of a State, or it must be acknowledged by a
State after its performance."40 Despite such categorical statements,
however, a more Lockean view occasionally appears in Oppenheim's
comments. In a footnote to that very statement, Oppenheim cites the
Jacobsen case discussed below as a decision "affirming the proprie-
tary right of a private individual in a part of Jan Mayen island occu-
pied by him at a time when it was terra nullius."' Similarly, an ear-
lier passage in the book acknowledges that private individuals and
corporations can acquire land that is "not under the territorial su-
premacy of a member of the Family of Nations" (i.e., terra nullius),
but in order to receive protection for the acquisition under interna-
tional law, the individual or corporation "must either declare a new
state to be in existence ... or must ask a member of the Family of
Nations to acknowledge the acquisition as having been made on its
behalf."42 Oppenheim's comments arguably reflect a positivistic per-
spective, recognizing that private parties can physically occupy terra
nullius, but asserting that this practical occupation implicates no le-
gal title to the land under international law. Considering the allusion
to Jacobsen v. Norwegian Government,3 however, Oppenheim may
be making a more Lockean argument: that private parties may legally
claim title to terra nullius, but, because of the state-focus of interna-
tional law, they must enlist a state to assert their legal rights on their
behalf.
Ian Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law" evinces
similar incertitude. Although questioning "whether private interests
established prior to the reduction into sovereignty of a terra nullius
39. 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 678 (Robert
Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992).
40. 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 2, at 507.
41. ld at 507 & n.2 (citing United States v. Fullard-Leo, 133 F.2d 743 (9th Cir.
1943)).
42. 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 2, at 496-97.
43. 7 I.L.R. 109 (1933-1934 Ann. Dig.) (Nor. Sup. Ct. 1940).
44. BROWNLIE, supra note 3.
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must be respected by the new sovereign," Brownlie acknowledges in
the footnote to this skeptical remark that French publicist Paul Gug-
genhiem "says that they must." 4
In contrast to Brownlie's and Oppenheim's vacillation, Guggen-
heim emphatically asserts that property rights in terra nullius are
protected by international law:
Les droits que les individus peuvent acqudrir dans un tel territoire sans
maitre rel~vent de 1'ordre juridique de leur Etat d'origine, A l'exception
des droits patrimoniaux. Conform~ment au droit international coutumier,
ces derniers sont regis directement par les rigles du droit international.
La pratique arbitrale et conventionnelle, en effet, est unanime A admettre
que les droits patrimoniaux crds par des ressortissants 6trangers dans les
territoires sans maitre doivent 6tre respect6s par l'Etat occupant'
As a result, his discussion of this subject presents a powerful exam-
ple of the continued influence of the Lockean notion of property in
modem international law. For Guggenheim, property rights in the ab-
sence of a sovereign are not contradictory. Property rights are sanc-
tioned by a fundamental law-international law--that not only sub-
stitutes for municipal law in its absence but supersedes it, mandating
that "les droits patrimoniaux... doivent 8tre respectds par l'Etat oc-
cupant," irrespective of the state's own laws. These brief passages
from Oppenheim, Brownlie, and Guggenheim are the exception,
however, not the rule. Most contemporary treatises are silent on this
issue.
Despite neglect by most contemporary publicists, older sources
contain many intimations that private parties can establish legally-
cognizable property rights in terra nullius. For example, in De Jure
Belli ac Pacis, Grotius criticizes legal scholars who make a broad
distinction between property which belongs to citizens by the law of
nations and that which belongs to the same persons by municipal
45. Id at 164-65 & n.1 (citing I PAUL GUGGEN-IEIM, TRArrt DE DRorr
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 456-57 (1954)).
46. GUGGENHEmi, supra note 45, at 456-57 (emphasis added) ('The rights that
individuals are able to acquire in terra nullius is governed by the laws of their state
of origin, except property rights. Consistent with customary international law,
these last are governed directly by the rules of international law. Arbitral and con-
ventional practice is unanimous in acknowledging that these hereditary/property
rights created by previous occupants in terra nullius must be respected by the oc-
cupying state.").
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law. In consequence they grant to the king a more unrestricted right
over property owned under the law of nations, even to the extent of
taking it away without cause and without compensation, while they
admit no such right in the case of property held by [municipal law].47
Emmerich Vattel is even more suggestive in his assertion that an
"independent individual... may settle in a country which he finds
without an owner, and there possess an independent domain ....
[Whoever] would afterwards make himself master of the entire
country, could not do it with justice without respecting the rights and
independence of this person."48
An equally intriguing assertion appears in Chief Justice Marshall's
famous opinion in Johnson v. McIntosh.49 As dicta, Marshall casually
presented
a principle of universal law that, if an uninhabited country be discovered
by a number of individuals, who acknowledge no connexion with, and
owe no allegiance to, any government whatever, the country becomes the
property of the discoverers, so far at least as they can use it. They acquire
a title in common.5"
Like the passage from Oppenheim, it is difficult to discern exactly
what Marshall means. In particular, it is unclear whether Marshall
believed that private individuals, acting as private individuals (not as
the founders of a new state), could establish legally-enforceable
property rights that other states would be obligated to respect.
Nonetheless, the Lockean influence in this passage is readily appar-
ent.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued an
opinion more than one hundred years after Johnson v. McIntosh
which illustrates the continued appeal of this natural rights vision,
despite the predominance of the conventional theory of property
during the intervening century. Citing Marshall's opinion, the court
asserts that "it is possible, under principles of international law for
47. GROTIUS, supra note 16, bk. 3, ch. 10, § 9, at 808.
48. VATTEL, supra note 6, bk. 2, ch. 7, § 96, at 170; see also id. § 97, at 170-71
(theorizing that groups of families possessing a free domain have a legal right to
the domain even though they have not formed a political society).
49. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
50. Id. at 595.
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two individuals to obtain title to such territory as they discover,"'"
The court also observes, however, that "such an occurrence is
rare."5 2 According to the court, the reason for this rarity is that al-
though private individuals may obtain a title in terra nulius, they are
powerless to protect it. 3 Thus, much like Oppenheim, the Ninth Cir-
cuit seems torn by competing visions. The court reaffirms the
Lockean ideal that private parties can make internationally-
recognized claims to property in terra nullius. Simultaneously, how-
ever, the opinion evinces a more positivistic belief that such claims
are meaningless in the absence of a state to give them legal definition
and sanction. Ultimately, however, the court reaftirms the principle
of Johnson v. McIntosh that private individuals can establish pro-
prietary rights in terra nullius.
Based on such hints and intimations, a few commentators in the
early part of the century suggested that private property rights in
terra nullius deserved recognition under international law. Mark
Lindley's The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory,'
for example, contains numerous suggestions to this effect. In ex-
plaining that terra nullius is land inhabited by "isolated individu-
als," Lindley contrasts the individuals' claims to sovereignty (which,
as individuals, they could not assert) with their claims to property (to
which, apparently, they were entitled): "[I]n such a case it would ap-
pear that the only rights possessed by them are rights of property and
that, as regards the sovereignty, the country would be territorium
nullius."55 Similarly, in a later passage, Lindley argues that if an in-
dividual asserts a proprietary interest in land over which his state
chooses not to exert sovereignty (i.e., retaining the status of terra
nullius), "the individual would be entitled to the protection of his
51. United States v. Fullard-Leo, 133 F.2d 743, 746 (9th Cir. 1943); 1
OPPENHEIM, supra note 2, at 507 & n.2 (citing Fullard-Leo for this proposition).
52. Fullard-Leo, 133 F.2d at 746.
53. See id at 746-47 (hypothsizing that the threat of conquest would deter
most explorers from claiming important lands and that taking possession on behalf
of a sovereign affords a better chance for reward).
54. LINDLEY, supra note 2.
55. Id at 23; see also I JOHN WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 109 (1913)
(" [W]here whites may have acquired [property] in uninhabited places by enter-
prise and industry of the fruits of which it would be an outrage for any government
established later to deprive them.").
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State against arbitrary action on the part of foreign Powers." 56
An even clearer expression of the idea that private property claims
in terra nullius are entitled to legal recognition under international
law appears in Charles Hyde's venerable compendium, International
Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States.5 In two
brief passages, Professor Hyde asserts that a state may "protect the
activities of its nationals within a distant island that is res nullius
without simultaneously striving to create a right of sovereignty
therein."58 Hyde also argues that a state may demand "that the pri-
vate property of its nationals in countries not possessed of European
civilization, and not belonging to states recognized as such, should
nevertheless be respected, upon the establishment of rights of sover-
eignty therein by an acknowledged member of the family of na-
tions." 9
B. JAN MAYEN ISLAND
Although numerous commentators have suggested the possibility
of legally-cognizable private property rights in terra nullius, the only
case in which a court has explicitly recognized such a property right
is the Norwegian Supreme Court's opinion in Jacobsen v. Norwegian
Government.60 In Jacobsen, the Court held that the Norwegian gov-
ernment was legally obligated to respect the proprietary claims of
Mr. Jacobsen to a part of Jan Mayen Island, even though his property
right was established prior to Norway's assertion of sovereignty over
the island.6
56. LINDLEY, supra note 2, at 85.
57. HYDE, supra note 33.
58. Id. at 346.
59. Id. at 236-37.
60. 7 I.L.R. 109 (1933-1934 Ann. Dig.) (Nor. Sup. Ct. 1940).
61. Jan Mayen Island is better known in contemporary international law from a
recent International Court of Justice adjudication of the dispute between Denmark
and Norway concerning the maritime boundary between Greenland and Jan Mayen
Island. See Maritime Delimitation in the Area Between Greenland and Jan Mayen
(Den. v. Nor.), 1993 I.C.J. 38 (June 14). Prior to that, Jan Mayen was also the
subject of an agreement between Iceland and Norway for the joint management of
the resources of the Jan Mayen continental shelf-a significant amount of rele-
vance for a relatively small island. See Elliot L. Richardson, Jan Mayen in Per-
spective, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 443 (1988) (reviewing the dispute resolution process
and the resulting agreement between Iceland and Norway).
280 [13:263
PROPERTY ASA NATURAL INSTITUTION
Jan Mayen Island is located in the North Atlantic, approximately
550 nautical miles west of Norway and 292 nautical miles north of
Iceland.62 With no indigenous population or economy, Jan Mayen's
principle feature is a meteorological station established in 1922.
Although Norway did not claim sovereignty over Jan Mayen until
1929, private occupation of the island began at least a decade ear-
lier.' Nonetheless, as late as 1923 the Norwegian Foreign Office of-
ficially informed the United States that it considered Jan Mayen to be
terra nullius.65
In 1902, Mr. Jacobsen bought title to a home and some land from
an individual who had been residing on Jan Mayen. In 1921, Mr. Ja-
cobsen organized an expedition to the island, claimed an even larger
part of the island as his property, and marked the boundaries of the
claimed area. After Norway asserted sovereignty in 1929, however,
its government ignored Mr. Jacobsen's claim to this property and as-
signed portions of the land for the use of the meteorological station.
Mr. Jacobsen sued.
The Norwegian Supreme Court held that the Norwegian govern-
ment's action was illegal. According to the court, the government
was obligated to respect Mr. Jacobsen's property claim as legally
valid, even though established while Jan Mayen was still terra nul-
lius, and that, consequently, the "Norwegian Government was not
entitled to proprietary rights in the part of the island which had been
occupied by the plaintiff."' The Court concluded that because "[alt
the time of [his] arrival . . . the whole island was no man's land[,]
[he was accordingly entitled to undertake a private occupation with
the object of obtaining property in the occupied landt 67 The Court's
reasoning is a paradigmatic illustration of the Lockean vision of
property.
62. See Richardson, supra note 61, at 443.
63. See Maritime Delimitation, 1993 I.C.J. at 46.
64. For example, in 1917, a Norwegian national claimed part of the island as
part of a plan to prospect for ore and establish a station for manufacturing seal-oil.
See Island of Jan Mayen, 1 HACKWORTH DIGEST § 71, at 474. In 1921, the Norwe-
gian Meteorological Institute established the still-existing meteorological station.
See Jacobsen, 7 I.L.R. at 110; 1 HACKWORTH, supra, at 474-75.
65. See 1 HACKWORTH, supra note 64, at 475.
66. Jacobsen, 7 I.L.R. 109, 110.
67. Id
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In fact, the Jacobsen case is literally a modem recreation of
Locke's man in the state of nature. By his labors (erecting several
huts), Jacobsen succeeded in "removing" the land "from the State of
Nature" and converting it into private property, property that his own
government was obligated to respect. The absence of a government
to authorize, or even give legal sanction to, his occupation was ir-
relevant. For the Norwegian Supreme Court, the absence of Norwe-
gian sovereignty in Jan Mayen did not invalidate Jacobsen's property
right.
Other incidents resulting from Norway's assertion of sovereignty
over Jan Mayen also suggest the powerful respect for private prop-
erty rights under international law. The Polarfront Company, owned
by an American citizen Hagard Ekerold, occupied land in Jan Mayen
and established two fox farms before Norway asserted its sover-
eignty.6" After Norway's assertion of sovereignty, the United States
Department of State sent a note to the Norwegian government stating
its expectation that Norway would respect the property rights of Mr.
Ekerold and his company.69 Norway responded that "the occupation
of Jan Mayen island by Norway was in no way intended to cause
changes in the rights which, according to civil law, 'exist in the is-
land." 7 0 Thus, not only did Norway find itself legally obliged in the
Jacobsen case to respect the property rights established in terra nul-
lius by its own citizen, it also considered itself obligated to respect
the property rights of a foreign national.
The exact nature of those property rights, however, was not clear.7
68. See I HACKWORTH, supra note 64, at 475-76.
69. See id.
70. Id. at 476 (quoting Message by the Norwegian Chargd d'Affairs to Mr.
Stimson, Aug. 7, 1929).
71. Professor Goldie has argued, based upon the Spitsbergen example dis-
cussed at infra notes 80-84, that the type of property title a private party can obtain
in terra nullius is essentially a usufruct. See L.F.E. Goldie, Title and Use (and
Usufruct)-An Ancient Distinction Too Oft Forgot, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 689 (1985).
Although Professor Goldie's use of the traditional property title of usufruct is in-
teresting and compelling, he has unnecessarily restricted the nature of property ti-
tle that a private party can establish in terra nullius. This restriction is principally a
result of his example. In Spitsbergen, the land at issue was being used for mining,
a perfect example of a usufructuary title-i.e., a right in the fruits of the land. With
the examples of Messrs. Jacobsen and Ekerold in Jan Mayen, however, we have
examples that would appear to support more than a mere usufructuary title. In both
instances, the private parties had developed the land-Mr. Ekerold's fox farms and
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In 1927, while Jan Mayen was still terra nullius, the Polarfront
Company asked the Department of State about the status of its prop-
erty claims.72 Its response evinced a positivistic doubt that property
rights could be created in the absence of state sovereignty over the
islands.73 The State Department observed:
Ownership, in its essential features, constitutes the use and enjoyment of
the property owned, to the exclusion of all others in its use and enjoy-
ment, and is secured to the owner under the authority of the Government
exercising the right of sovereignty with relation both to the island and its
inhabitants.74
At the same time, however, the State Department was unwilling to
state that Mr. Ekerold lacked a legal right to the land his company
occupied in Jan Mayen. As subsequent cables to the Norwegian gov-
ernment indicate, the State Department believed that Mr. Ekerold
possessed proprietary rights, which it expected Norway to respect. 75
In other words, the United States government was torn by conflicting
images of property. On the one hand, it argued that the absence of a
government to sanction and protect such rights "rendered it impossi-
ble [for Polarfront] to acquire title to property there, as ordinarily un-
derstood." 76 At the same time, however, it was unwilling to condemn
the company as a mere trespasser, arguing that the company's labors
in developing the island had created a property right-if not a title
"as ordinarily understood" 
-which Norway was required to re-
spect.
77
Whatever the exact nature of Messrs. Ekerold's and Jacobsen's
property rights in Jan Mayen during its status as terra nullius, the
important point is that after Norway's assertion of sovereignty, Nor-
way considered itself legally bound to respect their pre-existing
claims.78 As such, these two instances are strong evidence of the in-
Mr. Jacobsen's huts-and were using the land for more than merely harvesting its
fruits.
72. See 1 HACKWORTH, supra note 64, at 476.
73. See id
74. Letter from the Department of State to Mr. Ekerold, Feb. 16, 1927, quoted
in 1 HACKWORTH, supra note 64, at 476 [hereinafter Ekerold letter].
75. 1 HACKWORTH, supra note 64, at 476.
76. Id
77. See id
78. See id
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temational custom that recognizes the legality of private property
claims established in terra nullius.
C. SPITSBERGEN ARCHIPELAGO
Another example of the recognition of private property rights in
terra nullius involves the Spitsbergen archipelago, a desolate cluster
of barren islands located in the Arctic Ocean about 400 miles from
Norway.79 Until the turn of the century, the islands were principally
uninhabited, visited only by whalers and hunters during the four
months when ice does not block the islands."0 No state considered it
worthwhile to assert sovereignty over the islands, because of their in-
accessibility and forbidding climate the states generally recognized
the status of the islands as terra nullius.8 '
In the early 1900s, however, large deposits of coal were discov-
ered. In 1906, an American company, the Arctic Coal Company, be-
gan profitable mining operations that encouraged mining companies
from other countries (including Norway, Russia, Germany, and the
United Kingdom) to make competing claims.
The interested nations did not know how to resolve these con-
flicting private mining claims in a territory that they had previously
recognized as terra nullius. This "Spitsbergen Question," as it came
to be known, became a major issue for international lawyers, as evi-
denced by Robert Lansing's article in the American Journal of Inter-
national Law (published just after his appointment as Secretary of
State), entitled A Unique International Problem.2 The solution was a
1920 treaty in which nine of the countries with an interest in Spits-
79. The Norwegian name for the archipelago, "Svalbard," means "land with
cold coasts" in Old Norse.
80. See generally ELEN SINGH, THE SPITSBERGEN (SVALBARD) QUESTION:
UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY, 1907-1935 (1980) (providing a very interesting
and thorough history of the "Spitsbergen Question").
81. See Robert Lansing, A Unique International Problem, II AM. J. INT'L L.
763, 764 (1917); see also Goldie, supra note 71, at 705; Fred K. Neilsen, The So-
lution of the Spitsbergen Question, 14 AM. J. INT'L L. 232 (1920); LINDLEY, supra
note 2, at 5; Message by President Taft to Congress (Dec. 3, 1912), 1912 FOR.
REL. at xx, reprinted in I HACKWORTH, supra note 64, at 465 (" [T]he subarctic
island of Spitzbergen ... has always been regarded politically as 'no man's land..
82. Lansing, supra note 81.
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bergen recognized Norway's sovereignty over the archipelago.' The
treaty is intriguing, not in its recognition of Norway's sovereignty
over the islands but in its limitation of that sovereignty.
In return for acquiring sovereignty over the islands, the treaty
mandated that Norway respect the rights of existing "Occupiers of
land" and provide equal freedom of access, commerce, mining and
fishing to citizens of the signatory countries.'$ Article 6 specifically
provides that "acquired rights of nationals of the High Contracting
Parties shall be recognized [by Norway]." 5 Article 7 stipulates that
"[e]xpropriation [of this property] may be resorted to only on
grounds of public utility and on payment of proper compensation."'
In order to implement these requirements, the parties established a
tribunal to adjudicate conflicting property claims.' As a result of the
tribunal's findings, Norway ultimately recognized the property
claims of nationals from several different countries.'
This restriction on Norway's sovereignty resulted from the other
signatories' insistence on the legal recognition of their nationals' pre-
existing claims to the islands. President Taft's Message to Congress
on December 7, 1909 is illustrative. In announcing the United States'
intention to attend the first Oslo Conference, President Taft strongly
defended the rights of the Arctic Coal Company, announcing that
83. See Treaty on the Spitsbergen Archipelago, Feb. 9, 1920, 43 Stat. 1892, 2
L.N.T.S. 7 [hereinafter Spitsbergen Treaty]; see also Neilsen, supra note 81. The
nine signatory nations were Denmark, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Norway,
the Netherlands, Sweden and the United States. Russia acceded to the treaty in
1924.
Great Britain and the United States applied a potentially analogous solution to
their dispute over the Oregon territory. The 1846 Treaty of Washington that re-
solved this conflict contained a provision that "the possessory rights of the Hud-
son's Bay Company, and of all British subjects who may be already in the occupa-
tion of land or other property lawfully acquired in the said territory, shall be
respected." Treaty for the Cession of Oregon, June 15, 1846, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art.
I, 9 Stat. 869 [hereinafter Treaty with Great Britain]; see also SIR TRAVERS
TWiss, THE OREGON QUESTION EXAImF.NED IN RESPECT TO FACTS AND THE LAW OF
NATIONs 151 (1846). Unlike the Spitsbergen islands, however, it is unclear
whether the Oregon territory was terra nullius at the time of the Treaty.
84. See Spitsbergen Treaty, supra note 83, arts. 2, 6 & 7.
85. Id art. 6.
86. Id
87. See LINDLEY, supra note 2, at 320.
88. See Report of the Svalbard Commissioner Concerning Claims to Land in
Svalbard (1927); LINDLEY, supra note 2, at 320.
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"all interests in those islands already vested should be protected"
and that there should be "equality of opportunity for the future." 89
Such assertions obviously reflect a natural rights vision of prop-
erty. The fact that these interests existed outside of any legal regime
was irrelevant.90 In fact, the international community's first attempt
to resolve this problem did not even view the creation of a sovereign
for the archipelago as necessary for the recognition and protection of
these rights. In 1914, a conference of the interested countries con-
vened in Oslo (then known as Christiania), Norway.9 Although this
body was eventually responsible for the Treaty of 1920, its initial
goal was more ambitious: to establish an international regime that
would perpetuate the islands' status as terra nullius, while protecting
the property interests of the various private parties.92 As such, this
"unique scheme" was a powerful illustration of a natural rights no-
tion divorcing property from sovereignty.
This idealistic, Lockean solution soon fell victim, however, to a
more modem, positivistic vision of property as fundamentally in-
tertwined with sovereignty. Perhaps the reason Lansing had consid-
ered the "Spitsbergen Question" so unique and intractable was that
89. Message of the President to Congress, Dec. 7, 1909, reprinted in 1909 FOR.
REL. at ix, xiii (1914); see also Neilsen, supra note 81, at 233 (claiming that the
United States' interest is limited to mining); Goldie, supra note 71, at 707-08 (cit-
ing United States diplomatic correspondence to the effect that "the United States
Government quite practically viewed the rights that the Arctic Coal Co. had ac-
quired in Spitzbergen as having been sufficiently established to be the subject of
an international arbitration as to the boundaries of the American enterprise's 'tract'
... .") (footnote omitted); 1 HACKWORTH, supra note 64, at 466 ("[The United
States] simply desired ... that the rights of its nationals in the islands be recog-
nized and property secured .... ).
90. In fact, one commentator, in describing the status of these property rights
while the islands were terra nullius, explicitly used Lockean language:
The practical men who established, and bought and sold, and made money out of their
mining tracts on Spitsbergen took a different view of their rights from that of the posi-
tivists .... Accordingly, before 1920 they established a regime whose basic agreement
("social contract") may be summarized as follows: "This is my tract because I am
working it."
L.F.E. Goldie, Comment, Customary International Law and Deep Seabed Mining,
6 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 173, 179 (1979).
91. The countries represented at the Conference included Denmark, France,
Germany, Great Britain, Norway, the Netherlands, Russia, Sweden and the United
States. See Spitsbergen Treaty, supra note 71.
92. See I HACKWORTH, supra note 64, at 466; LINDLEY, supra note 2, at 5;
Neilsen, supra note 81, at 233; Lansing, supra note 81, at 765.
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he, and other international lawyers, were torn by conflicting images
of property. On the one hand, they felt that the law should respect the
property claims of their nationals. These parties had exerted their la-
bor in developing the islands, and their interests should not be ig-
nored simply because they existed outside of any recognized state or
legal regime. On the other hand, as progeny of a positivistic age, it
was difficult to conceptualize property rights outside of the legal
context of sovereignty:
In these circumstances a real right, in the common acceptance of the term,
cannot exist in Spitzbergen .... The essential feature of ownership is the
exclusion of all others from the use and enjoyment of the things owned...
: Ownership in the case of land in Spitzbergen could not, therefore, ex-
ist.9
Thus, the conference participants discarded the natural rights no-
tion underlying the original conference proposal as "many finely
spun theories ... some of them doubtless a bit too fine."' Instead,
they applied a "more practicable" -i.e., positivistic-solution. They
recognized one nation as sovereign for all of the islands and, there-
fore, capable of bringing legal vitality to these property claims: "Be-
cause a sovereign was needed on Spitzbergen in order to create the
legal basis for exclusive property rights that would be good against
all the world, the treaty recognized Norway as sovereign." "
Despite this Hobbesian solution, the generally Lockean lesson of
Spitsbergen-that although the islands were terra nullius, property
claims established by private parties "were held to be, and were
protected as, 'exclusive' and 'vested' rights"6-should not be ig-
nored. As such, the "Spitsbergen Question" remains one of the most
dramatic applications of Vattel's assertion that "[a]n independent in-
93. Lansing, supra note 81, at 769; see also Neilsen, supra note 81, at 234
(" The provisions of the annex properly accord international recognition to rights,
which have heretofore been legally undefined, since, of course, claimants to land
in a terra nullius could have no title under municipal laws where such laws did not
exist .... ).
94. Neilsen, supra note 81, at 233.
95. Steven J. Burton, Freedom of the Seas: International Lmv Applicable to
Deep Seabed Mining Claims, 29 STAN. L. REv. 1135, 1157 (1977); See also
Lansing, supra note 81, at 770-71.
96. Goldie, supra note 71, at 705; see also id. at 706 (distinguishing between
vested rights and interests already vested); GUGGENHEIM, supra note 45, at 457.
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dividual... may settle in a country which he finds without an owner,
and there possess an independent domain [and] [w]hoever would af-
terwards make himself master of the entire country, could not do it
with justice without respecting the rights and independence of this
person." 
97
D. GUANO ISLANDS
Another example of the recognition of private property rights in
terra nullius appears in United States diplomatic practice involving
the Guano Islands. In 1854, two American nationals discovered
guano deposits in the Los Monges Islands-a collection of barren
rocks located nineteen to twenty miles off the Venezuelan coast.98
The two Americans, Messrs. Gowen and Copeland, established fa-
cilities on the islands and began to work the deposit. In 1855, the
Venezuelan government, claiming sovereignty over the islands, ex-
pelled the Americans and seized their facilities.99 Several years later,
an arbitral commission, established by treaty between the United
States and Venezuela, awarded the Americans $20,000 in damages.
The commission's opinion contains a powerful assertion of the
Lockean notion that property exists independent of the state. The
commission found that even though the islands appeared to be terra
nullius when the Americans discovered them, the Americans "pos-
sessed 'an equity to be reimbursed for their outlay in taking posses-
sion of what was apparently derelict and abandoned property.' 100
97. VATTEL, supra note 48, bk. 2, ch. 7, § 96, at 170.
98. This account of the Los Monges dispute is based on 4 JOHN BASSETT
MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH
THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 3354-3359 (1898) [hereinafter
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS] and 1 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 576-577 (1906).
99. See 1 MOORE, supra note 98, at 576. Interestingly, Venezuela's actions
were apparently instigated by another American company, which, upon hearing of
the large deposits in the Los Monges, had approached Venezuela to obtain a lease
to the islands. See INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS, supra note 98, at 3355.
100. 1 MOORE, supra note 98, at 577 (quoting INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS,
supra note 98, at 3354-59) (emphasis added). It is important to note that when the
commission described the islands as "derelict and abandoned," it was employing
terms of art. See INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS, supra, at 3359. As Lindley ex-
plains, "Territory that has been occupied may again become territorium nullius...
because the sovereignty over it has been abandoned-in which case it is that spe-
cies of territorium nullius which is known as territorium derelictum." LINDLEY,
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For the commission, the fact that no country had asserted sovereignty
over the islands did not prohibit Messrs. Gowen and Copeland from
establishing a property right in the islands. Clearly, the commission
did not consider state sovereignty a necessary element in the creation
of a property right. The only thing necessary to create a property
right, according to the commission, was labor by the Americans, la-
bor for which they received compensation.
If the commission ultimately decided that the Americans did not
"own" the islands, it did not base its finding on a philosophical op-
position to the notion that property can exist outside of the state. In-
stead, the commission based its finding on the actions of the Ameri-
can businessmen, which the commission interpreted as an indication
that "[they] did not consider that they had established title to the is-
lands."' 10' In fact, the commission concluded that the Americans
could have established such title if "only they had stubbornly stood
on their rights and demanded indemnity for the wrong done them."' 0 2
The same outcome occurred in a similar dispute that involved the
discovery of guano deposits on the Aves Islands by United States
nationals in 1854. The Americans began to exploit the deposits but
Venezuela subsequently claimed sovereignty over the islands. The
United States government considered the islands terra nullius, how-
ever---" not embraced within the sovereignty of any power, but were
derelict"-and therefore demanded compensation from Venezuela
"for molesting [its citizens] and breaking up their business." 0 3 For
the United States, the fact that its citizens claimed property rights to
territory outside the sovereignty of any state obviously did not raise
doubts about the validity of their complaints. In a subsequent con-
vention between the United States and Venezuela, Venezuela paid
$130,000 in reparations to the victims.104
Whether a specific impetus or not, these types of incidents helped
encourage the passage of legislation in Congress in 1856 ("Guano
supra note 2, at 48; see also BROWNLIE, supra note 36, at 135-36; O'CONNELL,
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 37, at 511-13.
101. INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS, supra note 98, at 3357.
102. Id
103. Memorandum from United States Secretary of State Marcey to Venezuelan
Minister Eames (Jan. 24, 1855), quoted in 1 MOORE, supra note 98, at 571.
104. See id (stating that the United States would not make further claims to the
islands).
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Islands Act") intended to promote the discovery and exploitation of
guano deposits on unclaimed islands in the Pacific Ocean and Carib-
bean Sea."0 5 Under the Guano Islands Act, American citizens who lo-
cated guano deposits on an "island, rock, or key" that was "not
within the lawful jurisdiction, or occupied by the citizens of any
other government"--i.e., terra nullius---could apply for protection of
their claim with the United States government." 6
Unlike the Los Monges and Ayes island incidents, however, the
international status of the islands claimed under the Guano Islands
Act was unclear. The Act itself stated that such islands would be
considered as "appertaining" to the United States. Unfortunately, the
Act did not articulate a clear definition of" appertaining." For exam-
ple, in an opinion issued in 1907, the State Department asserted that
"the United States possess[es] no sovereign or territorial rights over
Guano islands." '07 In the same year, however, an opinion by the So-
licitor of the War Department took a slightly different approach, ob-
serving that "while not territory of the United States... [the islands]
would seem to be, internationally speaking, within the jurisdiction of
the United States." 0 ' In an 1890 opinion, the United States Supreme
Court went even further, stating that an island covered by the Act
was a "possession of the United States." 1 9
105. See Act to Authorize Protection of Citizens who Discover Deposits of
Guano, 11 Stat. 119 (1856) [hereinafter Guano Act].
106. Memorandum from the Legal Advisor of the Department of State to
Messrs. Eccleston and Knife (Sept. 2, 1936) (emphasis added), quoted in 1
HACKWORTH, supra note 64, at 503.
107. Cable from Assistant Secretary of State Bacon to Messrs. Dudley and
Michener (Jan. 3, 1907) [hereinafter Dudley Cable], quoted in 1 HACKWORTH, su-
pra note 64, at 502.
108. Opinion of the Solicitor for the Department of State (Sept. 25, 1907),
quoted in 1 HACKWORTH, supra note 64, at 503. This nebulous status is arguably
equatable with the notion of" inchoate title," which recognizes that a "[s]tate that
is in [the] process of perfecting its title has more claim to the terra nullius than any
other, though its title is not unimpeachable." O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 37, at 478; see also Palmas Island Case, 2 U.N. Rep. 829 (1928); 1
OPPENHEIM, supra note 2, at 510-11. Such an inchoate title would not vest the
United States with legal sovereignty over the islands; instead it would serve notice
to other states of the United States' intention to occupy the islands, which other
states would respect out of a sense of comity. See WESTLAKE, supra note 15, at
158.
109. Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 203-04 (1890); see also Memoran-
dum from Attorney General Sargent to Secretary Hughes (June 24, 1925) (stating
that the extension of United States protection is within the President's discretion,
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Irrespective of the questionable status of these islands, the disputes
arising under this Act evinced a very different conception of property
than that which emerged in the Los Monges and Ayes island dis-
putes. In those cases, the courts recognized property rights in a com-
plete legal vacuum.1 By contrast, in the disputes arising under the
Guano Act (although the nature of the relationship of the affected is-
lands with the United States was not always clear), the Act itself cre-
ated the property rights at issue."' The Act specified the limited na-
ture of these rights, which extended "only to appropriation and
disposal of the guano" on the islands."2 Thus, in a case concerning
Navassa Island-whose occupation by American guano excavators
in 1857 led to a brief military showdown with Haiti-the Supreme
Court made clear that whatever rights the discoverers possessed in
the islands "derived from the United States." '3
Grounding these property rights in a federal statute did not neces-
sarily mean that the United States rejected the underlying philosophi-
cal principle of the Los Monges and Aves Island cases. In fact, as the
subsequent practice in Jan Mayen and Spitsbergen illustrate, the
United States continued to assert the natural rights notion that prop-
erty rights can be created in terra nullius. However, passage of the
Act reflected a conventional belief that American claims in guano
and, once a tenant is under United States protection, no act by that tenant can end
United States control), quoted in 1 HACKWORTH, supra note 64, at 505, 518. But
see Jones, 137 U.S. at 221 (citing 1859 opinion by the Attorney General "to the
effect that the president has no right under the law to annex a guano island to the
United States.").
110. See supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text.
111. See Guano Act, supra note 105, § I.
112. Dudley Cable, quoted in I HACKWORTH, supra note 64, at 502 (interpret-
ig the statute's provision); see also Guano Act, supra note 105, § 2 (discussing
"the exclusive right of occupying said island... for the purpose of obtaining said
guano").
The Act acknowledged the claim of" the discoverer, or his assigns," however, it
suggested that the original discoverer's property right included the ability to assign
property. Id § 2. Moreover, an 1872 revision extended the Act to include "the
widow, heirs, executors and administrators of such discoverer." Act to Amend
Guano Act, § 1, 17 Stat. 48 (1872). The United States Supreme Court, however,
decided the right was not such an estate in land that it should be subject to dower.
Duncan v. Navassa Phosphate Co., 137 U.S. 647, 652 (189 1).
113. See Duncan, 137 U.S. at 651-52 (characterizing the limited proprietary
right as a "license" to occupy the island and remove the guano which "cannot last
after the guano is removed [and] may be terminated at any time 'at the pleasure of
congress'); see also Jones, 137 U.S. at 218; 1 MOORE, supra note 98, at 577.
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islands would be stronger if grounded in municipal law.
E. "BACKWARD" TERRITORY & "UNCIVILIZED" PEOPLES
Western treatment of "backward territory" provides yet another
example of the recognition of property rights in terra nullius and the
natural rights image of property that motivated this recognition.
During the nineteenth century, most Western international lawyers
considered territories occupied by indigenous, "uncivilized" peoples
to be terra nullius."4 As Professor Jennings observed, the nineteenth-
century requirement that a territory not be subject to the sovereignty
of a state in order to qualify as terra nullius was "not to say, of
course, that the territory need be uninhabited. Natives living under a
tribal organization were not regarded as a state for this purpose...
, 115
114. See Robert A. Williams, Jr., Redefining the Terms of Indigenous Peoples'
Survival in the World, 1990 DUKE L.J. 660, 673-76; see also Burton, supra note
95, at 1165; H. Elizabeth Dallam, The Growing Voice of Indigenous Peoples, 8
ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 117, 125 (1991); Robert K. Hitchcock, International
Human Rights, the Environment, and Indigenous Peoples, 5 COLO. J. INT'L
ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 7 (1994). But see Matthew M. Ricciardi, Title to the Aouzou
Strip: A Legal and Historical Analysis, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 301, 396 (1992)
(" [Scholars] could not agree, however, whether the land possessed by 'savage' or
'barbaric' tribes with a rudimentary organization qualified as terra nullius or
whether, on the contrary, such tribes were deemed to be sovereign and their rights
entitled to respect.").
The best discussion of this issue appears in LINDLEY, supra note 2, at 10-47.
Lindley concludes that "over some three and a half centuries, there had been a
persistent preponderance of juristic opinion in favour of the proposition that lands
in the possession of any backward peoples who are politically organized" are not
terra nullius, "[b]ut that, especially in comparatively modem times, a different
doctrine has been contended for.., a doctrine which denies that International Law
recognizes any rights in primitive peoples to the territory they inhabit." Id. at 20;
cf O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 37, at 469-70 (arguing that the
equation of uncivilized territory with terra nullius was an ex post facto "invention
by late nineteenth century authors" that did not accurately describe actual practice
in previous centuries).
115. ROBERT JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 20 (1963); see also Brownlie, supra note 3, at 119. Quotations to support
such assertions are not hard to come by. The juxtaposition of "territory which is
either unsettled or settled only by savages" reappears throughout official state-
ments fo the period. Memorandum from United States Secretary of State Upshur to
Mr. Everett (Oct. 9, 1843), quoted in 1 MOORE, supra note 98, at 259; see also
Opinion of Mr. Sidney Webster, quoted in 1 MOORE, supra note 98, at 261 ("The
principle and rule to be deduced respecting title to unoccupied regions, or those in
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Of course, under modem international law, such an anachronistic
definition of terra nullius is no longer acceptable, legally or mor-
ally.11 6 A modern, alternative interpretation of this practice, adopted
by Professor O'Connell in his classic treatise, The Law of State Suc-
cession, treats the transition from "uncivilized" to "civilized" as a
unique instance of state succession. Under this interpretation, the
colonizing power succeeds the tribal authorities as sovereign over the
territory in question."7 This re-interpretation accords with some state
practice from the early twentieth century, as the holding of the Brit-
ish-American Claims Tribunal in its famous George Rodney Burt
opinion suggests: "The Crown authorities by refusing to recognize
his title, failed to carry out the obligation which Great Britain, as the
succeeding Power in the islands, must be held to have assumed." "
However, irrespective of this successful attempt to harmonize nine-
teenth-century practice with contemporary law, the fact remains that
in the nineteenth century such territory was considered terra nul-
lius.119
the possession of the aboriginal inhabitants .... "). In the third edition of
INTERNATIONAL LAW, the renowned Lassa Oppenheim observed that terra nullius
included both territory that was "entirely uninhabited, as e.g. an island, or inhab-
ited by natives whose community is not to be considered as a state." LASSA
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 383-84 (Ronald Roxburgh ed., 3d ed.1920).
Interestingly, this passage can still be found as late as the 6th edition, published in
1947. See 1 OPPENHI-M, supra note 2, at 507. Similarly, John Westlake, another
influential publicist, stated that as a general assumption of international law,
"[o]ccupation by uncivilised tribes of a tract... was not felt to interpose a serious
obstacle to the right of the first civilised occupant."
116. See, e.g., Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute (Libya v. Chad), 1994
I.C.J. 6, 54-55 (Feb. 3); id, 1994 I.C.J. at 93 (Sette-Camara, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that the territory was never terra nullius); Western Sahara Case, 1975 I.C.J. 12,
39 (Oct. 16); Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2), 175 C.L.R. 1 (Austl. 1992) (abandon-
ing the legal doctrine that Australia was terra nullius when occupied by Great
Britain in 1788); JOSEPH G. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
185 (8th ed. 1977) (stating that "territory inhabited by tribes or peoples having a
social and political organisation cannot be of the nature of terra nullius") (quoting
Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12.
117. See O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 36, at 92-94. But see 1
OPPENHEIM, supra note 2, at 510 & n.1.
118. George Rodney Burt (U.S.) v. Great Britain, in FRED K. NEiLSEN, REPORT
ON AMERICAN AND BRITISH CLAIMS ARBITRATION 588, 598 (1926) [hereinafter
NEILSEN REPORT] (emphasis added).
119. An interesting reflection of the continued vitality of the natural rights per-
spective of property, this reinterpretation of state practice regarding " backward"
territories preserves the underlying philosophical notion that property is distinct
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Although Western legal practice and theory considered such terri-
tory terra nullius (enabling Western countries to ignore indigenous
peoples' territorial claims and acquire territory by occupation), this
same legal tradition required Western countries to respect the private
property claims of Western nationals in "uncivilized" territory, even
if these property claims originated in grants by the indigenous soci-
ety.22 Thus, as Lindley observed, as "the general rule, rights of pri-
vate property, including land and concessions, which foreigners have
acquired in backward territory, remain unimpaired when the territory
passes under the sovereignty of an advanced state." ''
The most famous expression of this legal principle is the George
Rodney Burt opinion from the British-American Claims Tribunal.' 21
The case, resulting from Britain's annexation of the Fiji islands
(which had been considered terra nullius prior to Britain's assertion
of sovereignty) in 1874, turned on whether the British government
had to respect the property title of George Burt, an American citizen,
even though Burt's title was acquired from a native chief prior to the
annexation.
Burt had resided on the islands since 1856. In 1868, he bought
3,750 acres of land from a native chief. The tribunal held that Burt
had received a legally-cognizable title that Britain had to respect:
"The Crown authorities by refusing to recognize his title, failed to
carry out the obligation which Great Britain, as the succeeding Power
in the islands, must be held to have assumed." 2 3 As a result, the tri-
bunal awarded Burt £ 10,000 as compensation. 2 1
from sovereignty. Thus, the change in sovereignty from the "backward," indige-
nous sovereign to the "civilized," colonizing power did not affect private property
rights).
120. See, e.g., WESTLAKE, supra note 15, at 145 ("In that case the state which
afterwards becomes sovereign will be bound to respect such right and give effect
to it by its legislation, morally bound if only its own subjects are concerned, but if
the previous right of property existed in a subject of another state, there can be no
doubt but that respect to it would constitute an international claim as legally valid
as any claim between states can be.").
121. LINDLEY,supranote 2, at 316.
122. Burt, in NEILSEN REPORT, supra note 118, at 588-98. The German gov-
ernment also pursued several claims on behalf of its citizens residing in Fiji, argu-
ing that "the property of the respective subjects of German Empire should be rec-
ognized and confirmed" by the British government. LINDLEY, supra note 2, at
318-19.
123. See Burt, in NEILSEN REPORT, supra note 118, at 598.
124. Id. In a similar case, the Tribunal recognized the validity of a private
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Similar outcomes occurred with Great Britain's and Germany's
subsequent assertions of sovereignty over the Gilbert, Solomon, and
Marshall islands groups. In a series of cables, the American Secre-
taries of State, Messrs. Bayard and Foster, expressed "the deep con-
cern" the United States felt over these countries' claims.'5 Although
the United States acknowledged the presence of the indigenous
population in these islands "where the traders of various nationalities
have obtained lodgment through good relations with the natives," the
United States government left no doubt that it considered the islands
terra nullius: "They are understood to belong to the large category of
hitherto unclaimed islands which have been under no asserted ad-
ministration, and... which have hitherto been free to the trade of all
flags ... ," 16 Despite their status as terra nullius, the United States
nonetheless demanded that Germany and Great Britain respect the
property rights of American citizens in the islands: "What we think
we have a right to expect, and what we are confident will be cheer-
fully extended as a recognized right, is that the interests found to
have been created in favor of peaceful American settlers in those
distant regions shall not be disturbed by the assertion of exclusive
claims of territorial jurisdiction on the part of any power ....
party's title to several reefs and rocks acquired prior to Britain's acquisition of
these islands. See Isaac M. Brower, in NEILSEN REPORT, supra note 118, at 612.
Commentators often contrast the Burt opinion with Successors of William Web-
ster, in NEILSEN REPORT, supra note 118, at 537, in which the Tribunal held that
Webster's claims to the land prior to Britain's acquisition of territorial sovereignty
were not as clear as those of Burt, and consequently, Great Britain was not obli-
gated to respect the claims. See 1 HACKWORTH, supra note 64, at 555;
O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 36, at 93 & n.2.
125. Cable from United States Secretary of State Bayard to Mr. Pendleton (Feb.
27, 1886) [hereinafter Pendleton Cable], quoted in I MOORE, supra note 98, at
422; see also Cable from United States Secretary of State Bayard to Mr. Morrow
(Feb. 26, 1886) [hereinafter Morrow Cable], quoted in I MOORE, supra note 98, at
423; Cable from United States Secretary of State Bayard to German Foreign Min-
ister von Alvensleben (Mar. 4, 1886) [hereinafter von Alvensleben Cable], quoted
in 1 MOORE, supra note 98, at 424-25; Cable from United States Secretary of State
Foster to Mr. White (Nov. 5, 1892) [hereinafter Foster Cable], quoted in 1 MOORE,
supra note 98, at 425-26.
126. Pendleton Cable, supra note 125, at 422-23; see also Morrow Cable, supra
note 125, at 423 (" [T]he outlying unattached groups of islands [in the Pacific], de-
pendent upon no recognized sovereignty .... ").
127. Pendleton Cable, supra note 125, at 423 (emphasis added); see also Foster
Cable, supra note 125, at 426 ("You will say to him that this Government believes
that it has a right to expect that the rights and interests of the American citizens
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The United States also repeatedly questioned why either Britain or
Germany could assert claims to the islands superior to that of other
countries:
It is not easy to see how either Great Britain or Germany can assert the
right to control and divide between them insular possessions which have
hitherto been free to the trade of all flags, and which owe the civilizing
rudiments of social organization they possess to the settlement of pioneers
of other nationalities than British or German. If colonial acquisition were
an announced policy of the United States, it is clear that this country
would have an equal right with Great Britain or Germany to assert a claim
of possession .... "
Of course, these American complaints did not dissuade either
Germany or Great Britain from asserting sovereignty over the is-
lands. Both countries, however, guaranteed the protection of the ex-
isting property rights of "civilized" settlers. Thus, when German
Foreign Minister von Alvensleben officially announced the creation
of the German protectorate over the Marshall Islands, he stated that
"well-established rights of third parties are to be duly respected." 129
Similarly, when Great Britain established a protectorate over the
Gilbert Islands in 1892, the United States issued a statement ex-
pressing its expectation that "the rights and interests of American
citizens established in the Gilbert Islands will be as fully respected
and confirmed under Her Majesty's Protectorate as they could have
been had the United States accepted the offer of protection not long
since solicited by the rulers of those islands."' 30 Great Britain re-
established in the Gilbert Islands will be as fully respected and confirmed under
Her Majesty's Protectorate . . . ."); Cable from United States Secretary of State
Bayard to Portugese Minister das Nogueiras (Mar. 3, 1886) (regarding the Portu-
guese protectorate over Sao Thomd). Mr. Bayard's cable to Mr. das Nogueiras
states:
If citizens of the United States.. .establish themselves in uncivilized regions and ac-
quire vested interests there in the same way as foreigners of other nationalities through
good relationship with the natives, it is not to be supposed that, in the event of any one
power... assuming control of the country, our citizens will be discriminated against,
in residence or trade, as compared with the subjects of the protecting power.
Id, at 424.
128. Pendleton Cable, supra note 125, at 423.
129. von Alvensleben Cable, supra note 125, at 425; see also O'CONNELL,
STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 36, at 94 & n. 1.
130. 1892 FOR. REL. 241, 246 (1895), quoted in O'CONNELL, STATE
SUCCESSION, supra note 36, at 93-94.
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sponded by promising that such rights "will be fully recognized and
respected." 13
This customary practice received partial codification in the Berlin
Conference of 1884-1885.132 Intended as ground rules for "new oc-
cupations on the African coasts" by the principal Western powers,
the Final Act of the Conference included "the obligation to insure
the establishment of authority in the regions occupied by them on the
coasts of the African Continent sufficient to protect existing rights
(droits acquis)." 33
This requirement to respect the pre-existing property claims of in-
dividuals was one of the major issues at the Conference. The initial
proposal of the German government was even more specific, de-
scribing the rights as those "acquired by private individuals" irre-
spective of "whatever period they may have been acquired, before as
well as after the occupation."31 Similarly, the President of the Con-
ference explained that acquired rights "comprised all the acquired
rights in existence at the time of a new occupation, whether these
rights belonged to private individuals or to governments." 131 Though
the Conference accepted this interpretation, as Lindley observes, "it
was not considered necessary to include the proposed explanation"' 36
because Article 35 was universally understood by the participants in
the Conference as "merely express[ing] in a formal manner a rule
which had previously obtained very considerable acceptance." 13
7
Although the hypocrisy inherent in this Western legal practice is
striking, the importance of the Berlin Conference-and the judicial
131. Id; see also 1 MOORE, supra note 98, at 425-26.
132. See Final Act of the Conference of Berlin, Feb. 26, 1885, 165 Consol. T.S.
485 [hereinafter Final Act]. The Final Act was signed by Austria-Hungary, Bel-
gium, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and the United States. The United States,
however, never ratified the Act. See LINDLEY, supra note 2, at 144.
133. Final Act, supra note 132, art. 35; see also Convention Revising the Gen-
eral Act of Berlin (Convention of St. Germain-en-Laye), Sept. 10, 1919, art. 10, 8
L.N.T.S. 25, 35 (containing a similar provision "to maintain in the regions subject
to their jurisdiction an authority and police forces sufficient to ensure protection of
persons and of property").
134. See LINDLEY, supra note 2, at 145-47.
135. Id at 147.
136. Id
137. Id at 146 (citing British and French statements).
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and diplomatic practice that it chronicled-to this article is not the
irony of a legal regime that disregarded the indigenous people's ter-
ritorial claims while simultaneously respecting the private property
claims of its nationals in such territory (even those based on grants
from the otherwise ignored indigenous peoples). Its importance lies,
instead, in providing yet more evidence that international law (at
least as interpreted in the nineteenth century by Western countries)
recognized property rights established in terra nullius as legally-
cognizable and protected under customary international law. As such,
this practice also evocatively demonstrates the considerable influence
of the natural rights image of property (with its vision of property
existing in the absence of state sovereignty) on international law.
III. DOCTRINE OF ACQUIRED RIGHTS
In addition to the recognition of private property rights in terra
nullius, the doctrine of acquired rights is another field of interna-
tional law that reflects the powerful influence of the Lockean notion
of property on modem international law. Although, as several com-
mentators have observed, the laws governing state succession in gen-
eral (such as whether a successor inherits its predecessor's debts) are
contentious and unsettled,'38 there is a remarkable consensus that a
change of sovereignty over a territory does not affect the vested or
acquired property rights of the inhabitants.'39 This principle is known
138. See Sayre, supra note 36, at 475 ("Perhaps no part of international law
gives rise to more uncertainty and disagreement than the law which determines the
resulting rights and duties of states and individuals upon a change of sover-
eignty-the so-called law of succession."); STARKE, supra note 116, at 353.
139. See, e.g., Georges Kaeckenbeeck, The Protection of Vested Rights in Inter-
national Law, 17 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 8-9 (1936) (arguing that the rule that "[a]
cession of territory therefore does not imply any change in the private rights of the
inhabitants nor does it legitimate the confiscation of any of those rights [is] an ac-
tual and universally accepted rule of positive law"); Sayre, supra note 36, at 477
(" [T]he general principle that change of sovereignty shall work no interference
with private property rights .... has been well established by innumerable court
decisions."); JAMES L. BRERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 157 (Sir Humphrey Wal-
dock ed., 6th ed. 1963) (" [T]he recent practice of states.., tends to establish as a
rule of international law the duty of a successor state ... to respect the acquired
rights of private persons.") (quoting I LASSA OPPENHEIM & ARNOLD MCNAIR,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 168 & n. (4th ed. 1928)); ARRIGO CAVAGLIER, LA NOTION
DES DROITS ACQUIS ET SON APPLICATION EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (1931);
KEITH, supra note 36, at 78; LINDLEY, supra note 2, at 387; O'CONNELL,
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as the doctrine of acquired rights and, as one commentator has ob-
served: "The principle that droits acquis-acquired rights-survive
incidents of state succession and must be respected by the successor
state is one of the most well-established norms in the field." 40 As
such, the doctrine remains one of the most powerful vestiges of the
natural rights notion of property in modem international law.
This natural rights perspective of property as insulated from a sov-
ereign's positivistic legal regime appears throughout the literature:
"Sovereignty and property being distinct and different entities, there
is no necessary reason why circumstances that affect the one should
have any influence upon the other." 1 41 This perspective views the
right to property as arising "within a prescribed legal order, an order
which derives its validity not from the ultimate legislative authority
but from the very community itself .... The order, therefore, does
not collapse or evaporate when the sovereign is removed, but sur-
vives .... 142
The repeated allusions to "equity" in both practice and treatises
demonstrate this rejection of the positivistic notion of property: "The
word 'equity' is the key, it is believed, to the entire problem of State
succession." 143 As Professor Starke concluded, the principle feature
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 37, at 436; O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION, su-
pra note 36, at 78, 99 (discussing the obligation of a successor state to respect
property rights acquired under the predecessor state); 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 2,
at 155 & n.5, 522; KURT VON SCHUSCHNIGG, INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF PEACE 153, 157-58 (1959); GEORG
SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 87 (1967); WESTLAKE,
supra note 15, at 130. See generally, I MOORE, supra note 98, at 95, 99, 332-34,
414-429.
140. Michael J. Volkovitsch, Note, Righting Wrongs: Towards a New Theory of
State Succession to Responsibility for International Delicts, 92 COLUIM. L. REV.
2162, 2203 (1992) (citing O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 36, at
239).
141. LINDLEY, supra note 2, at 337.
142. O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 36, at 267; see also Kaecken-
beeck, supra note 139, at 2 (arguing that the emphasis on "droits acquis" or
"vested rights" was "to distinguish between such rights as, deriving only from a
statutory provision, could also be taken away by statutory provision, and such
rights as, resting on special title of acquisition, could not be thus taken away").
143. O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 36, at 268; see also id at 105;
United States v. Auguisola, 68 U.S. (I Wall.) 352, 358-59 (1863); United States v.
Kingsley, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 476, 484-85 (1838) ("[T]he United States must main-
tain the rights of property under it ... by applying, in the first instance, in such
cases, as was said in Arredondo's case, the principles ofjustice ..... ).
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of the doctrine of acquired rights is "a tendency to pay regard to the
question whether it is just, reasonable, equitable, or in the interests
of the international community that rights should pass upon external
changes of sovereignty over territory." "
This emphasis on equity and justice--divorcing the doctrine from
legal sources-evinces, as Professor O'Connell argues, a concern
with insulating "private rights from the impact of changes of sover-
eignty."' 45 In explaining this concern, commentators often evoke
Lockean language, arguing that "[a] man who invests capital and la-
bour in the construction of works of profit and value to a State ac-
quires an equity in that investment that is not destroyed by change of
sovereignty" 14 6 and that "human nature manifests a certain con-
stancy, and respect for property is by no means unrelated to, or a far
derivative of, the requirements of human nature." 147
In order to properly protect such a fundamental notion of property,
it was inevitable that the courts and commentators of the developed
Western countries (the Anglo-American tradition, in particular)
would have to insulate such property rights from the positivistic idea
that property rights are nothing more than what a particular country's
legal regime will recognize:
The right to land is one on any sound theory of jurisprudence valid
against all the world, including the Government.... The idea that a Gov-
ernment normally owns the land of a country is a confusion .... A state
is sovereign in public law over the territory, but it does not own the terri-
The doctrine's criticisms of the medieval notion that a sovereign monarch per-
sonally "owned" the territory subject to his control also reflect a rejection of a
positivistic notion of property-thus, equating sovereignty with property. See, e.g.,
LINDLEY, supra note 2, at 337.
144. STARKE, supra note 116, at 353 (emphasis added).
145. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 37, at 426 (citing Grotius,
Pufendorf, and Vattel); see also Kaeckenbeeck, supra note 139, at 1, 16;
O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 36, at 103-04, 273 (arguing that "the
principle of unjustified enrichment is the norm behind the doctrine of respect for
acquired rights in the law of State succession, and is the concept which renders the
data of practice intelligible").
146. O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 36, at 268; see also Sayre,
supra note 36, at 483 ("To eject or disregard the titles of all those who by their toil
and daring had given to the land its value would have been a mockery of justice..
. S).147. O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 36, at 274.
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tory. 1
4 8
The vehicle for this insulation was the doctrine of "equity" and the
notion that, with respect to property, obligations superseding sover-
eignty governed the actions of sovereign powers.
A. PERCHEMAN AND ITS PROGENY
The doctrine of acquired rights-with its Lockean perspective of
property as distinct from sovereignty-has been most clearly (and
emphatically) formulated in a series of decisions by the United States
Supreme Court, beginning with Chief Justice Marshall's famous
opinion in United States v. Percheman.149 In Percheman, Marshall
articulated the doctrine's basic premise: that when there is a change
in sovereignty over a particular territory "[t]he people change their
allegiance; their relation to their ancient sovereign is dissolved; but
their relations to each other, and their rights of property, remain un-
disturbed."'55 0
The case arose out of the cession of Florida by Spain to the United
States in 1819. The plaintiff, Juan Percheman, had acquired ap-
proximately 2,000 acres of land in Florida by grant from the Spanish
Governor of East Florida prior to the cession.' After the cession, a
commission-established by the United States government to ascer-
tain and clarify the status of property claims in East Florida-refused
to recognize his claim, charging that his title was insufficiently
documented.12 The Supreme Court, through Marshall, reversed the
commission's decision, holding that "[t]he modem usage of nations,
which has become law, would be violated; that sense of justice and
of right which is acknowledged and felt by the whole civilized world
would be outraged, if private property should be generally confis-
cated, and private rights annulled."' 53
148. KEnH, supra note 36, at 81; see also WESTLAKE, supra note 15, at 131-32.
149. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
150. Percheman, 32 U.S. at 87. The importance of the Percheman opinion in the
development of the doctrine of acquired rights cannot be exaggerated. By Francis
Sayre's description, it is the "classic case which has been quoted and followed
universally until it has become a famous landmark in this part of the law." Sayre,
supra note 36, at 479; see also Kaeckenbeeck, supra note 139, at 9.
151. See Percheman, 32 U.S. at 82-83.
152. See id at 83-84.
153- Id at 86-87.
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The treaty of cession between the United States and Florida had
contained a stipulation that the United States would respect the le-
gitimate property claims established prior to the change in sover-
eignty. 114 Marshall could have based his decision solely in this provi-
sion. Instead, Marshall chose to ground his decision on his
interpretation of customary international law, concluding that even if
Florida had "changed its sovereign by an act containing no stipula-
tion respecting the property of individuals, the right of property in all
those who became subjects or citizens of the new government would
have been unaffected by the change; it would have remained the
same as under the ancient sovereign." '55
Although Marshall did not cite any sources to support this holding,
the attorney for Percheman in his oral argument did cite Emmerich
Vattel's classic treatise, The Law of Nations, for the proposition that
"according to the mitigated rights of war, as now well understood
and settled by international law, the lands of individuals are safe,
even after conquest."56 Marshall's reasoning demonstrates his reli-
ance on this citation:
[I]t is very unusual, even in cases of conquest, for the conqueror to do
more than to displace the sovereign and assume dominion over the coun-
try .... If this be the modem rule, even in cases of conquest, who can
doubt its application to the case of an amicable cession of territory?'57
Prior to the Percheman decision, American courts had issued nu-
merous opinions, some by Justice Marshall, recognizing the same
general principle. Neither the Percheman opinion nor the oral argu-
ments cited these cases, however. For example, three years before
Percheman, Marshall commented that in
the treaty by which Louisiana was acquired, the United States stipulated
154. Treaty of Amity, Settlement and Limits, Feb. 22, 1819, U.S.-Spain, art.
VIII, 8 Stat. 252 [hereinafter Treaty with Spain] ("All the grants of land made be-
fore the 24th of January, 1818, by his Catholic Majesty, or by his lawful authori-
ties, in the said territories ceded by his Majesty to the United States, shall be rati-
fied and confirmed to the persons in possession of the lands, to the same extent
that the same grants would be valid if the territories had remained under the do-
minion of his Catholic Majesty.").
155. Percheman, 32 U.S. at 87.
156. Id. at 65 (citing 3 VATrEL, supra note 48, ch. 13, § 200).
157. Id. at 86-87.
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that the inhabitants of the ceded territory should be protected in the free
enjoyment of their property. The United States, as a just nation, regard
this stipulation as the avowal of a principle which would have been held
equally sacred, though it had not been inserted in the contract.' 8
A myriad of Supreme Court decisions followed Percheman in
which the Court reinforced the holding in Percheman.'5 9 In Leitens-
158. United States v. Soulard, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 511, 511-12 (1830) (Marshall,
C.J.); see also Mutual Assurance Soc. v. Watts, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 279, 282
(1816) ("The idea is now exploded that a mere change of sovereignty produced
any change in the state of rights existing in the soil."); Johnson v. McIntosh, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 589 (1823) (Marshall, C.J.) ("[H]umanity demands, and a
wise policy requires, that the rights of the conquered to property should remain
unimpaired.. ."); American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 511, 542 (1828)
(Marshall, C.J.) (" On such a transfer of territory, it has never been held that the
relations of the inhabitants with each other undergo any change."); United States
v. de la Arredondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691, 712 (1832); Wilcox v. Henry, 1 U.S. (1
Dall.) 69, 71 (1782) ("If, also, a conquered country is ceded, the old possessors are
entitled to their estates; and when any country is conquered, the possessors are not
deprived of their estates, but only change their masters."). These cases principally
involve property claims arising from the Mexican-American War and the subse-
quent cessions of Arizona, California, New Mexico, and annexation of the Repub-
lic of Texas.
159. See Shapleigh v. Mier, 299 U.S. 468, 470 (1937); John II Estate v. Brown,
235 U.S. 342, 349 (1914) (Holmes, J.); Ainsa v. New Mexico & Ariz. R.R. Co.,
175 U.S. 76, 79 (1896) ("Private rights of property in land lying within a territory
ceded by one independent nation to another... are not affected by the change of
sovereignty and jurisdiction, and are entitled to protection, whether they are com-
plete and absolute titles, or merely equitable interests . . . ."); Ely's Adm'r v.
United States, 171 U.S. 220, 223 (1898) (" [I]n harmony with the rules of interna-
tional law, as well as with the terms of the treaties of cession, the change of sover-
eignty should work no change in respect to rights and titles; that which was good
before should be good after; that which the law would enforce before should be
enforceable after the cession."); Cessna v. United States, 169 U.S. 165, 186 (1898)
("It is the duty of a nation receiving a cession of territory to respect all rights of
property as those rights were recognized by the nation making the cession .... ");
United States v. Chaves, 159 U.S. 452, 457 (1895); Knight v. United Land Ass'n,
142 U.S. 161, 184 (1891); Interstate Land Co. v. Maxwell Land Grant Co., 139
U.S. 569, 588 (1891) ("It needs no citation of authorities to support the general
proposition of international law that private rights of property in a ceded territory
are nowise affected by a treaty of cession."); More v. Steinbach, 127 U.S. 70, 78
(1888); Coffee v. Groover, 123 U.S. 1, 9 (1887) ("It is no doubt the received doc-
trine that, in cases of ceded or conquered territory, the rights of private property in
lands are respected."); Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S.
542, 546 (1885) ("By the cession public property passes from one government to
the other, but private property remains as before, and with it those municipal laws
which are designed to secure its peaceful use and enjoyment."); Airhart v. Mas-
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dorfer v. Webb 1 6 0-a case arising out of the cession of New Mex-
ico-the Court stated:
By this substitution of a new supremacy, although the former political
relations of the inhabitants were dissolved, their private relations, their
rights vested under the Government of their former allegiance, or those
arising from contract or usage, remained in full force and unchanged ....
This is the principle of the law of nations as expounded by the highest
authorities." 6'
Similarly, in Strother v. Lucas, 62 the Supreme Court expostulated
that "[b]y the law of nations ... the rights of property are protected,
even in the case of a conquered country, and held sacred and inviola-
ble when it is ceded by treaty, with or without any stipulation to such
effect." 6 Several state courts-in particular, the Texas Supreme
Court and its subordinate courts-for understandable geographic rea-
sons also have developed a rather extensive body of precedent, re-
asserting the general principle of Percheman: "It is elementary that a
change of sovereignty does not affect the property rights of the in-
habitants of the territory involved." "
sieu, 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 491, 496 (1878) (following Jones v. McMasters, 61 U.S. (20
How.) 8, 21-22 (1857)) ("The general principle is undisputed, that the division of
an empire works no forfeiture of a right of property previously acquired .... The
title remains after the revolution, and erection of the new government, the same as
before."); Dent v. Emmeger, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 308, 312 (1871) ("[A] change of
government is never permitted to affect pre-existing rights of private property.");
United States v. Repentigny, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 211, 259-60 (1866); United States
v. Auguisola, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 352, 358 (1863); United States v. Moreno, 68 U.S.
(1 Wall.) 400, 404 (1863) ("That cession did not impair the rights of private prop-
erty. They were consecrated by the law of nations .... ."); United States v. Power's
Heirs, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 570, 577 (1850); Doe v. Eslava, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 421,
445 (1850); Smith v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 326, 330 (1836); Mitchel v.
United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 734 (1835); Delassus v. United States, 34 U.S.
(9 Pet.) 117, 133 (1835) (Marshall, C.J.) ("The sovereign who acquires an inhab-
ited territory, acquires full dominion over it; but this dominion is never supposed
to divest the vested rights of individuals to property .... The people change their
sovereign. Their right to property remains unaffected by this change.").
160. Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 176 (1857).
161. Leitensdorfer, 61 U.S. at 177-78.
162. Strother v. Lucas, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 410 (1838).
163. Strother, 37 U.S. at 436, 438.
164. Miller v. Letzerich, 49 S.W.2d 404, 407-08 (Tex. 1932) (" [I]t is plain, we
think, that whatever title, rights, and privileges the inhabitants of Texas received
by virtue of land grants from the Spanish and Mexican governments... remained
intact, notwithstanding the change in sovereignty .... "); Clements v. Texas Co.,
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In addition to this extensive judicial precedent, American treaties
have followed the natural rights principle of Percheman that changes
in sovereignty do not affect private property. The 1819 Treaty with
Spain discussed in Percheman was not unique in including a provi-
sion protecting private property in the ceded territory. In fact, every
major treaty of cession to which the United States has been a party
has included similar provisions. 16' For example, the treaty ending the
American Revolution contained two articles for the protection of pri-
vate property.1 66 Similarly, the Treaty of Paris that concluded the
Spanish-American War included a provision that provided that the
cession of Spanish colonies to the United States did not "in any re-
spect impair the property or rights which by law belong to... private
individuals, of whatsoever nationality such individuals may be." 67
As the American judiciary repeatedly observed, however, "[t]his
is the usual stipulation in treaties and is in effect a declaration of the
rights of the inhabitants under international law." ,' As such, these
273 S.W. 993, 999 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925); Texas v. Gallardo, 135 S.W. 664, 669
(Tex. Civ. App. 1911), af'ac 166 S.W. 369 (Tex. 1914) ("[I]t should be borne in
mind that a mere change of sovereignty, even in the absence of treaty stipulations
for the protection of private rights, does not divest the vested property rights of in-
dividuals.").
165. See, e.g., Treaty for the Cession of Louisiana, Apr. 30, 1803, U.S.-Fr., art.
I1, 8 Stat. 200 ("The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the
Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as possible, according to the
principles of the Federal constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advan-
tages, and immunities of citizens of the United States; and in the mean time they
shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their... property...
."); Treaty with Spain, supra note 154, art. VIII; Treaty with Great Britain, supra
note 83, art. III (" [Tihe possessory rights of the Hudson's Bay Co., and of all
British subjects who may be already in the occupation of land or other property
lawfully acquired in the said territory, shall be respected."); Treaty of Peace,
Friendship, Limits and Settlement, Feb. 2, 1848, U.S.-Mex., art. VIII, 9 Stat. 922
("In the said territories, property of every kind, now belonging to Mexicans ...
shall be inviolably respected."); Treaty with Mexico, Dec. 30, 1853, U.S.-Mex,
art. V, 10 Stat. 1035; Treaty for the Cession of Alaska, Mar. 30, 1867, U.S.-Russ.,
art. I1, 15 Stat. 539; Treaty for the Cession of the Danish West Indies, Aug. 4,
1916, U.S.-Den., art. II, 39 Stat. 1706 ("[I]t is understood that this cession does
not in any respect impair private rights which by law belong to the peaceful pos-
session of property of all kinds by private individuals of whatsoever nationality...
166. See Definitive Treaty of Peace, Sept. 3, 1783, U.S.-Gr. Brit., arts. V & VI,
8 Stat. 80.
167. Treaty of Peace, Dec. 10, 1898, U.S.-Spain, art. VIII, 30 Stat. 1754.
168. Eastern Extension, Australasia and China Telegraph Co. v. United States,
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courts considered the principle expressed by these treaties to be cus-
tomary international law, legally obligatory even if not stipulated by
treaty: "The United States, as a just nation, regard this stipulation as
the avowal of a principle which would have been held equally sacred,
though it had not been inserted in the contract." 1
69
In addition to rather extensive judicial and contractual precedent,
Professor O'Connell has observed, " [t]he absolute duty of a succes-
sor State to respect the rights of landowners was enunciated in no
less vigorous terms in United States diplomatic practice." 7 0 The
American opposition to the proliferation of British and German pro-
tectorates in the South Pacific during the later part of the nineteenth
century is an example of such practice.171 During the same period,
United States Secretary of State Bayard expressed strong protests to
the Chilean government after the 1879-1883 war between Peru and
Chile. Pursuant to the peace terms, Chile acquired sovereignty over
the nitrate-rich TarapacA province that contained property held by
several American commercial interests. The Chilean government
subsequently began to review all land titles in the province, ostensi-
46 Ct. Cl. 646, 649 (1911) (citing United States v. de ]a Arredondo, 31 U.S. (6
Pet.) 691, 712 (1832)); see also Municipality of Ponce v. Roman Catholic Apos-
tolic Church, 210 U.S. 296, 324 (1908) ("[T]he treaty has merely followed the
recognized rule of international law which would have protected the property of
the church in Porto Rico subsequent to the cession."); 1 MOORE, supra note 98, at
414 (" Stipulations for the protection of rights of property may also be found in
other treaties by which the United States has acquired title to territory. They are
held by the courts to be merely declaratory of the law of nations.").
169. United States v. Soulard, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 511, 512 (1830); see also Knight
v. United Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161, 184 (1891) ("Irrespective of any such provi-
sion in the treaty, the obligations resting upon the United States, in this respect,
under the principles of international law, would have been the same."); Coffee v.
Groover, 123 U.S. 1, 9 (1887) ("It is true that the property rights of the people, in
those cases, were protected by stipulations in the treaties of cession, as is usual in
such treaties; but the court took broader ground, and held, as a general principle of
international law, that a mere cession of territory only operates upon the sover-
eignty and jurisdiction ... and not upon the private property of individuals ....");
Coffee v. Groover, 123 U.S. 1, 9 (1887); Dent v. Emmeger, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.)
308, 312 (1871) ("The treaty so provided, and such would have been the effect of
the principles of the law of nations if the treaty had contained no provision upon
the subject."); United States v. Moreno, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 400, 404 (1863) ("The
treaty stipulation was but a formal recognition of the pre-existing sanction in the
law of nations."); Strother v. Lucas, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 410, 435 (1838); Delassus v.
United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 117, 133 (1835) (Marshall, C.J.).
170. O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 36, at 80.
171. See discussion in text at supra notes 125-131.
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bly to harmonize these titles with its own property laws.
In a cable to the American ambassador in Santiago, Secretary of
State Bayard presented a rather detailed legal justification for the
opinion of the "Government of the United States... that titles de-
rived from a duly constituted prior foreign government to which it
has succeeded are 'consecrated by the law of nations' even as against
titles claimed under its own subsequent laws." " This statement is
arguably the strongest possible assertion of the Lockean notion of
property in that not only does Secretary Bayard assert that private
property rights survive a succession unharmed, but that a successor
state is prohibited from making any subsequent adjustments to pre-
existing property rights, even to harmonize them with its own prop-
erty laws.
B. INTERNATIONAL PRECEDENT & THE GERMAN SETTLERS CASE
Considering this wealth of precedent--judicial, conventional, and
diplomatic--it is not surprising that several commentators have ob-
served that "[t]he principle that cession works no impairment of pri-
vate property rights has nowhere been more clearly enunciated than
in the United States." 73 Foreign courts soon incorporated the doc-
trine into the jurisprudence of several other (principally European)
172. Cable from United States Secretary of State Bayard to Mr. Roberts, March
20, 1886, quoted in 1 MOORE, supra note 98, at 422 [hereinafter Roberts Cable].
The dispute between Panama and Costa Rica over the "Sixaola territory" at the
beginning of the century provides yet another example. See 1 HACKWORTi, supra
note 64, at 526-27. Costa Rica claimed sovereignty over the territory pending the
ratification of a treaty that would have transfered the territory to Panama. Costa
Rica began to seize property owned by the American Banana Company. While ac-
knowledging the continued legality of Costa Rica's claim to the territory (until the
eventual transfer), the United States argued that "Costa Rica exercises at present a
temporary de facto sovereignty over the territory ... continuing until such time as
the pending boundary treaty is ratified." Memorandum from U.S. Secretary of
State Root to Costa Rican Minister Magoon, April 16, 1906, quoted in 1
HACKWORTH, supra note 64, at 527. As a result, the United States argued that
"[h]er functions of government are limited by her tenure, which is of a temporary
and precarious character. Her duty is to preserve the property, not to destroy it, and
hand it over to her successor without the commission of any acts tending to impair
the ultimate rights of the de jure owner." Id
173. Sayre, supra note 36, at 479; see also O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION,
supra note 36, at 79-80; KEITH, supra note 36, at 78 ("The United States is pecu-
liarly rich in judicial and other dicta on this head."); O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 36, at 436.
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countries, often by explicit citation to Marshall's famous opinion."'
The statements of Argentinean publicist Charles Calvo are paradig-
matic:
La conqu&e, nous l'avons dejA drmontr6, change les droits politiques des
habitants du territoire et transfare au nouveau souverain ]a propridt6 du
domaine public de son c~dant. I1 n'en est pas de m~me de la propridtd
privde, qui demeure incommutable entre les mains de ses 1dgitimes pos-
sesseurs. 'Ce serait violer un usage qui a acquis force de lois entre les na-
tions modemes,' dit lejuge Marshall A propos de la translation d'un pays
d'une souverainet6 A une autre, 'ce serait outrager ce sentiment de justice
et de droit reconnu par tous les peuples civilisds .... ' "
Numerous treaties of cession during the period which "frequently
provide[d] for the quiet enjoyment of the private property of indi-
viduals" demonstrate the general acceptance of this doctrine during
the nineteenth century. 176 Like the American courts, European com-
174. As John Bassett Moore once observed, because of the apotheosis of Mar-
shall as interpreter of the Constitution, scholars often overlook his important role
in the development of modem international law:
So marked was his supremacy... so profoundly did his opinions affect the course of
national development, that we are accustomed to think of him in the United States only
as the expounder of the Constitution. This is not, however, his sole title to fame. He is
known in other lands as the author of important opinions on questions which deeply
concern the welfare and intercourse of all nations .... [l]t was his lot in more than one
case to blaze the way in the establishment of rules of international conduct ....
John Moore, John Marshall: An Address, 16 POL. SCI. Q. 393, 404-05 (1901).
175. 4 CHARLES CALVO, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 399 (5th ed. 1896) ("Con-
quest, as we have already demonstrated, changes the political rights of the inhabi-
tants of the territory and transfers to the new sovereign the public property located
in the transferred territory. It does not affect private property which remains un-
changed in the hands of its legitimate possessors. 'This would violate the usage
which has become the law between modem nations,' said Justice Marshall re-
garding the transfer of a country from one sovereign to another, 'it would outrage
the sentiment ofjustice and law recognized by all civilized people... ."') (empha-
sis added); see also Sayre, supra note 36, at 497 ("It seems fair to assume, there-
fore, that the general principles underlying the decisions of the United States land
cases are not of purely local extent, but are principles of international recognition
and validity . . . .") (citing French, German, and Italian publicists); O'CONNELL,
STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 36, at 90-99 (discussing the diplomatic and judicial
practice in the matter of acquired rights).
176. KEITH, supra note 36, at 78, 80 (citing several German and English treaties
of cession); see also O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 36, at 90 & n.5
("Most of the treaties of cession of the nineteenth century, whether relating to
European, American or undeveloped countries, contained provisions for the pro-
tection of acquired rights.") (citing more than twenty treaties as evidence of the
308 [13:263
PROPERTY AS A NATURAL INSTITUTION
mentators felt that such contractual "stipulations [were] unneces-
sary" since "treaties in this respect [were] declaratory of the com-
mon International Law." '77
This "common International Law" was reflected in a judicial
precedent which, though not as rich as that of the United States, af-
forded considerable protection to private property rights in territories
subject to state succession. Considering the prevalence of the
Lockean view of property in the English common law, it is not sur-
prising that English law and practice often articulated this rule. For
example, in an opinion for the British Privy Council, Lord Haldane
stated that "a mere change of sovereignty is not presumed to disturb
rights of private owners; and the terms of a cession are prime facie to
be construed accordingly."' 8 His opinion echoed an earlier holding
by the same court that "[a]ccording to the well-understood rules of
International Law a change of sovereignty by cession ought not to af-
fect private property." '79
English courts, however, were not alone in promulgating such a
Lockean notion of private property rights. The Romanian-Hungarian
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal-established to handle claims between these
countries following the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire
and transfer of Hungarian Transylvania to Romania-re-af irmed
that "[a] measure as a result of which the property of an ex-enemy is
taken away in its entirety from the owner constitutes, prima facie, a
violation of the general principle of respect of acquired rights and
oversteps the limits of common international lav." '8
proposition).
177. KErrH, supra note 36, at 78.
178. Amodu Tijani v. Secretary, Southern Nigeria, 2 A.C. 399, 407 (1921) (re-
quiring monetary compensation for expropriation of property); see also Salaman v.
Secretary of State of India, I K.B. 613, 638 (1906); The Fama, 5 Robinson's Rep.
106, quoted in Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 176, 177 (1857) C' [T]he
settled principle of the law of nations, that the inhabitants of a conquered territory
change their allegiance ... but their relations to each other, and their rights of
property ... remain undisturbed."); West Rand Gold Mining Co. v. The King, 2
K.B. 391, 411 (1905) (distinguishing the sanctity of private property with con-
tractual obligations: "[T]he obligations of conquering States with regard to private
property of private individuals, particularly land as to which the title had already
been perfected before the conquest or annexation, are altogether different from the
obligations which arise in respect of personal rights by contract."); KErrH, supra
note 36, at 79-80.
179. Cook v. Sprigg, A.C. 572 (1899).
180. Kulin v. Roumanian State, abstracted in 4 I.L.R. (1927-1928 Ann. Dig.),
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Similarly, after the creation of the Palestinian Mandated Territo-
ies, a Palestinian court, considering the status of property titles pre-
viously derived under Ottoman law, announced that "the mere
change of State, however, is not an act of confiscation." The court
observed that "[t]his theory supports the generally accepted view that
the substitution of a new State for an old can make no difference to
existing private rights in and over property." 8' In a genuflection to
the positivist theory of property, however, the court did acknowledge
that such property rights could be violated if "specifically extin-
guished by the treaty itself," but dismissed such a theoretical possi-
bility by stating that "in practice ... the power is seldom, if ever,
acted upon." 182
The advisory opinion of the Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice in its German Settlers Case..3 confirmed the status of the doc-
trine of acquired rights. The Permanent Court concluded that the
doctrine enunciated in Percheman was customary international
law."s The German Settlers Case concerned the eviction of German
settlers by Poland from territory that Germany ceded to Poland after
the First World War. The case addressed the validity of contracts
with the former Prussian authorities on which the German settlers
based their tenancies. The Permanent Court held that Poland was ob-
ligated to respect these contracts and, therefore, the settlers' tenan-
cies:
88, 90 (emphasis added); see also Thalheimer v. Yugoslav State, abstracted in 4
I.L.R. (1927-1928 Ann. Digest) 88, 90) ("[R]eaffirmed in favour of Hungarian
nationals ... the rule of international law according to which a State acquiring for-
eign territory by way of cession or conquest is bound to respect existing private
rights.. . ."); Les Anciens Urbalistes de la Commune de Beremond v. Yugoslav
State, cited in 4 I.L.R. (1927-1928 Ann. Digest) 88, 90 & n.2.
181. Heirs of Prince Mohamed Selim v. Palestine, abstracted in 8 I.L.R. 123,
125 (1935-1937 Ann. Dig., Palestine; Land Court of Jaffa 1937); see also Greece
v. Bulgaria, abstracted in 7 I.L.R. 91 (1933-1934 Ann. Dig., Osten Unddn, Arbi-
trator 1933).
182. Selim, supra note 181, 8 I.L.R. at 125.
183. Certain Questions Relating to Settlers of German Origin in the Territory
Ceded by Germany to Poland, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 6 (Sept. 10) [hereinafter
German Settlers].
184. See German Settlers at 36 (Sept. 10); see also Case Concerning Certain
German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 7, at 42 (May
25) (reaffirming the holding in the German Settlers Case that the doctrine of ac-
quired rights is "a principle which, as the Court has already had occasion to ob-
serve, forms part of generally accepted international law.").
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Private rights acquired under existing law do not cease on a change of
sovereignty .... It can hardly be maintained that, although the law sur-
vives, private rights acquired under it have perished ... even those who
contest the existence in international law of a general principle of State
succession do not go so far as to maintain that private rights ... are inva-
lid as against a successor in sovereignty."s
The Court dismissed Poland's contention that it did not have to re-
spect the German settlers' property rights as "based on no principle
and would be contrary to an almost universal opinion and prac-
tice." 186
C. POSITIVISTIC RESTRICTIONS ON THE DOCTRINE OF "DROITS
ACQUIS"
Even the doctrine of acquired rights evinces the tension in interna-
tional law between the natural rights and conventional perspectives
of property. Although emphasizing a Lockean notion of property in
its basic assertion that "mere" changes in sovereignty do not affect
property rights, the law of state succession does not completely in-
sulate private property from the successor sovereign. Instead, the law
of state succession recognizes that a new sovereign can adjust prop-
erty rights through general, non-discriminatory legislation. As Pro-
fessor Lauterpacht succinctly put it, "[t]he transfer of sovereignty by
cession or by subjugation does not ipso facto affect rights of private
property, though the subsequent legislation of the new sovereign may
affect them." 187
During the late nineteenth century, several developed countries
challenged this acknowledgment of the state's control of property,
arguing that property held by non-nationals was immune from any
adverse legislative changes."8 8 For example, in its dispute with Chile,
the United States declared that Chile had violated the doctrine of ac-
quired rights by adjusting property rights in a recently conquered ter-
185. German Settlers, 1926 P.C.I.J. at 36.
186. Id (emphasis added).
187. 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 2, at 501 & n.9; see also VON SCHUSCHNIGG, su-
pra note 139, at 157-58.
188. See O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 36, at 100-01 (asserting
that nationalization of certain industries has led to the abandonment of the princi-
ple that a successor state may not interfere with private property fights in the ter-
ritory it absorbs).
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ritory:
Title to land and landed improvements is, by the law of nations, a con-
tinuous right, not subject to be divested by any retroactive legislation of
new governments .... [What] is here denied is the right of any govern-
ment to declare titles lawfully granted by its predecessor to be vacated
because they could not have been lawfully granted if its own law had, at
the time in question, prevailed. 89
Such claims were the exception, however, not the rule. Most of the
practice and commentary in this field evinces a more modem, posi-
tivistic belief in the fundamental ability of a successor state to alter
property fights in newly acquired territory. 90 As one commentator
observed: "Being now their sovereign, it may indeed impose any
burdens it pleases on its new subjects-it may even confiscate their
private property, since a sovereign State can do what it likes with its
subjects." '91 Professor O'Connell's explanation intimates a similarly
positivistic notion of property as the creation of the state. Professor
O'Connell notes that since the previous sovereign power could al-
ways adjust property rights through its power of eminent domain,
"[t]here is no reason ... why acquired rights should be invested after a
change of sovereignty with a 'sanctity and permanence' greater than they
had before." 9 Comparable expressions appear in judicial statements:
"[B]y the law of nations, the inhabitants, citizens or subjects of a con-
quered or ceded country, territory or province, retain all the rights of
property which have not been taken from them by ... the laws of the
sovereign who acquires it by cession." 93
Thus, under the doctrine of acquired rights, a sovereign can
change the private property rights in an affected region, but only if it
does so in accordance with its other international obligations. As Pro-
189. Roberts Cable, supra note 172, at 422; see also Kaeckenbeeck, supra note
139, at 13.
190. See KEITH, supra note 36, at 78; Kaeckenbeeck, supra note 139, at 14;
O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 36, at 99-102 ("The principle of re-
spect for acquired rights in international law is no more than a principle that
change of sovereignty should not touch the interests of individuals more than is
necessary. This does not mean that these interests may not be interfered with at
all.").
191. 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 2, at 522.
192. O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 36, at 101.
193. Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 734 (1835).
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fessor Starke observes, because "there is no rule of international law
obliging [a new sovereign] to respect the former municipal legal
system... [a] successor state can always displace existing rights and
titles by altering the former municipal law, unless in doing so, it
breaks some other independent duty under international law, for in-
stance, by expropriating the property of aliens arbitrarily, and not for
a public purpose." 19 4 In other words, the new sovereign's ability to
adjust vested rights is subject only to the general restriction that "a
state cannot elude international obligations, or render internationally
illegal acts internationally legal by enacting a statute to that ef-
fect." 19
5
Thus, if a private party were a national of the state asserting sover-
eignty over a territory, that state could adjust the property rights in
the territory with virtual impunity (as long as the state made such
adjustments through general legislation that did not discriminate
against its new subjects).' 96 If the private party were not a national of
the new sovereign, however, then the state would have, as Professor
Starke suggested, the additional responsibilities incumbent upon a
state under international law to respect the property of foreign na-
tionals-i.e., to not expropriate the property arbitrarily and to pro-
vide just and adequate compensation.' 97 Nonetheless, in general, the
doctrine of acquired rights recognizes a sovereign as having a fairly
unfettered authority to adjust property rights after a change in sover-
194. STARKE, supra note 116, at 362; see also O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 37, at 441 (stating that a change in sovereignty does not prevent a
successor state from modifying or even expropriating an individual's pre-existing
property rights as international law permits).
195. Kaeckenbeeck, supra note 139, at 13.
196. See 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 2, at 155 & n.5 ("The successor State cannot
avoid its obligations by enacting legislation either of a discriminatory character or
nominally affecting all the residents of the territory.").
197. See STARKE, supra note 116, at 362; see also O'CONNELL, STATE
SUCCESSION, supra note 36, at 102 (stating that if a successor state alters or can-
cels property rights, it must provide adequate compensation or grant an equivalent
title to the holder of rights, as required by international law); Kaeckenbeeck, supra
note 139, at 16 (postulating that the obligation of a successor state is to make com-
pensation "as a minimum of justice and fairness in the treatment of foreigners,
which a state may not transgress without exposing itself to rightful intervention
and international liability"). For a general discussion of the obligations of a state
under the doctrine of state responsibility for the expropriation of private property
of aliens, see supra note 2; STARKE, supra note 116, at 326; BRIERLY, supra note
139, at 284-85; SCHVARZENBERGER, supra note 139, at 105-06.
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eignty.
Another positivistic restriction on the doctrine of acquired rights is
the limited ability of private individuals to assert their rights under
this doctrine. For example, many countries, the United Kingdom in
particular, have developed municipal law doctrines that prohibit pri-
vate individuals from securing their rights under international law
through municipal courts when the defendant is their own govern-
ment.'98 These "Act of State" doctrines represent the conventional
perspective of property rights that exist in the legal systems of most
Western nations: the state, as creator of property, can adjust property
rights under municipal law with impunity, even if its acts apparently
violate some international (Lockean) norm.
International law presents a similar bar in the principle that only
states are legal actors under international law and, hence, capable of
enforcing the international rights of their nationals. This bar on the
individual pursuit of rights under international law is based on the
same positivistic principles underlying the notion that property is a
creation of the state: that the state is the fundamental expression of
man, and that, in the absence of such state structure, all is anarchy.'99
Considering the affinity of many publicists for the doctrine of ac-
quired rights (and its underlying philosophical vision of property as
more fundamental than the state), it is not surprising that these publi-
cists also advocate the ability of individuals to assert their rights be-
fore international tribunals. Kaeckenbeeck, for example, proposes
that private parties should have standing to appear before such tribu-
nals °0 because the inability of individuals to prosecute their rights
198. See O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 36, at 85-90; KEITH, Su-
pra note 36, at 83-84; 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 2, at 154-55 & n.5; O'CONNELL,
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 37, at 437-39; Kaeckenbeeck, supra note 139, at
11.
199. Compare Kaeckenbeeck, supra note 139, at 18 ("The supporters of the
sovereign state, and with it, of international law in its present structure, deny the
capacity of humanity to integrate itself politically, and see in the individualism of
man an anarchic force.") with HOBBES, supra note 26, at 183-88 (discussing that
regardless of the judge's power in interpreting the law, the people will not allow an
interpretation that contradicts human nature).
200. See Kaeckenbeeck, supra note 139, at 17. Kaeckenbeeck's suggestions
evolved from his experience as presiding judge of one of the International Mixed
Arbitration Tribunals (established by the Treaty of Versailles) which granted pri-
vate parties standing. See generally GEORGES KAECKENBEECK, THE
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before international tribunals often leads to inequity.2 ' Similarly,
Professor O'Connell, author of the classic treatment of the law of
state succession, argues that
theory and practice establish that the individual has legally protected in-
terests, can perform legally prescribed acts, can enjoy rights and be the
subject of duties under municipal law deriving from international law,
and if personality is no more than a sum of capacities, then he is a person
in international law, though his capacities may be different from and less
in number and substance than the capacities of States.'
INTERNATIONAL EXPERME-iNT OF UPPER SILESIA (1942). Other tribunals that have
granted standing to private individuals claiming personal rights include the Central
American Court of Justice established between Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua, and El Salvador by the 1907 Treaty of Washington; the Central Com-
mission for the Navigation of the Rhine and the European Commission of the Da-
nube; and the stillborn International Prize Court provided for in Articles 4 and 5 of
the Hague Convention of 1907. See MAREK ST. KoROWICz, INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 348-50, 353-60 (1959); Edwin M. Borchard, Access of Indi-
viduals to International Courts, 24 AM. J. INT'L L. 359, 360 (1930); Quincy
Wright, The End of a Period of Transition, 31 AM. J. INT'L L. 604, 610-12 (1937);
O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 37, at 121 & n.84-86. See gener-
ally DENIS SCHULf, LE DROIT D'ACCES DES PARTICULIERS AUX JURISDICTIONS
INTERNATIONALES (1935).
201. See Kaeckenbeeck, supra note 123, at 16; see also BRIERLY, supra note
139, at 277 (discussing the lack of remedy available to a private individual when
his state refuses to take up his case, and the delays often involved in requiring a
defendant state to go to arbitration).
202. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 37, at 118; see also
O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 36, at 85-86 (referring to "the now
largely discredited theory that the individual cannot be a subject of international
law .... [T]he prevailing tendency to give persons other than sovereign States the
right of appearance before international tribunals is breaking down the old as-
sumptions that States only are the subjects of international law.").
Of course, these comments are only part of a general trend beginning early in
this century of recognizing private parties as legal personalities under international
law. See, e.g., Harold Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE LJ.
2347, 2358-59 & n.66-67 (1991); Marek St. Korowicz, The Problem of the Inter-
national Personality of Individuals, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 533, 534-540 (1956);
Quincy Wright, War Crimes, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 257, 265 (1945) ("The concept of
the individual as a subject of international law has been developed by numerous
publicists, and has been recognized in official declarations and treaties which per-
mit individuals... to petition international institutions, [and] which propose inter-
national tribunals before which individuals could be parties . . . ."); ST.
KOROWICZ, supra note 200, at 327-28 ("The idea that international law rules not
only the intercourse of independent States but also that its provisions are directly
binding on individuals without the intermediary of their State, is as old as the sci-
ence of international law itself."); O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note
AM. U. INTLL. REV.
Nonetheless, state practice has consistently viewed the protection
of vested rights from a more conventional perspective. This perspec-
tive intimately links property to the state, considers the state the prin-
cipal actor under international law and, therefore, views the state as
the only vehicle to assert such rights. °3
Finally, the restriction that the doctrine of acquired rights protects
only vested rights--i.e., fights that were recognized under the previ-
ous state's legal regime-illustrates the influence of the conventional
perspective: "[T]he succeeding Government is not obligated to rec-
ognise rights which were not legal under the law of his predeces-
sor."204 Inchoate rights-rights that had not been fully legally vested
prior to the succession-are "of imperfect obligation and affected
only the conscience of the new sovereign."205
Even in the context of inchoate rights, however, the Lockean vi-
sion emerges. Several American commentators have maintained that
a legally sanctioned title is unnecessary and that a successor state is
"bound to recognise and protect all private rights in land, whether
they are held under absolute grants or inchoate titles, for property in
land includes every class of claim to real estate, from a mere incep-
tive grant to a complete, absolute, and perfect title."206 To do other-
37, at 116-21; VON SCHUSCHNIGG, supra note 139, at 69-72; BRIERLY, supra note
139, at 277 ("It has been suggested that a solution might be found by allowing in-
dividuals access in their own right to some form of international tribunal ... a pos-
sible reform which deserves to be considered."); see also 35 (11) Annuaire de
l'Institut de Droit International 267, 271 (1930) (adopting a resolution that
"[t]here are cases in which it may be desirable to recognize the right of individuals
to directly appeal to an international judicial body in their differences with
states"). But see SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 139, at 38-39 (noting that: (i)
municipal courts are in a lower category than international courts and the standing
of the courts differs considerably; (ii) the act of state doctrine imposes restrictions
on the judicial freedom of municipal courts; and (iii) "only on the lowest level are
judgments of municipal courts merely evidence of national attitudes to interna-
tional law").
203. See, e.g., Kaeckenbeeck, supra note 139, at 17-18; O'CONNELL, STATE
SUCCESSION, supra note 36, at 85-86.
204. KEITH, supra note 36, at 82 (citing United States v. Hanson, 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) 196 (1842)); see also Sayre, supra note 36, at 484-87, 492-94; O'CONNELL,
STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 36, at 83 ("To receive the protection of interna-
tional law an interest must have been properly vested, bonafide acquired and duly
evidenced.").
205. Dent v. Emmeger, 81 U.S. 308, 312; see also O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 37, at 437 & n.45 (citing several other opinions to this point).
206. 2 HENRY W. HALLECK, HALLECK'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 505 (Baker ed.
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wise, "[t]o eject or disregard the titles of those who by their toil and
daring had given to the land its value would have been a mockery of
justice. 2 7 This was particularly the case in "the new Louisiana ter-
ritory [where] ... pioneer settlers... often had to place more reli-
ance upon their muskets than upon legal rules and titles, nothing was
more common than to hold land without recorded legal ile." 20
Thus, despite such positivistic restrictions, the general principle of
the doctrine of acquired rights remains unchallenged: a change of
sovereignty does not affect a change in private property rights be-
cause these rights are distinct from the state and are grounded in no-
tions of equity and justice. As such, this general principle is a dra-
matic example of the continued influence of the Lockean notion of
private property in modem international law.
IV. MILITARY OCCUPATION
In addition to the recognition of property rights in terra nullius
and the protection of property under the doctrine of acquired rights,
the ambiguous and contradictory law governing military occupation
also illustrates the influence of the natural rights image of property.
International law distinguishes military occupation as a unique phase
of military operations, governed by a slightly more restrictive set of
rules than actual combat. Unfortunately, there is no consensus on
what constitutes an occupation or at what point an occupation begins
or ends.2"9 Article XLII of the annex to the Hague Conventions of
1878); see also Strother v. Lucas, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 410, 436 (1838) ("This court
has defined property to be any right, legal or equitable, inceptive, inchoate, or per-
fect ... as to affect the conscience of the former sovereign."); Ainsa v. New
Mexico & Ariz. R.R Co., 175 U.S. 75, 79 (1899) (stating that changes of sover-
eignty and jurisdiction do not affect the validity of private property rights, both
perfected and unperfected) (relying on Rio Arriba Land & Cattle Co. v. United
States, 167 U.S. 298, 309 (1897)); Stoneroad v. Stoneroad, 158 U.S. 240, 248
(1895); Astiazaran v. Santa Rita Land & Mining Co., 148 U.S. 80, 80-82 (1893).
207. Sayre, supra note 36, at 483.
208. Id But see id at 484-87 (discussing the requirement that, although a title
that was inchoate prior to cession could be binding on the successor state, the title
had to have been recognizable under the predecessor's laws if the individual had
chosen to petition for legal title).
209. See, e.g., Adam Roberts, What is a Militay Occupation?, 55 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 249 (1984); NISUKE ANDO, SURRENDER OCCUPATION, AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN EVALUATION OF U.S. PRACTICE IN JAPAN
93-95 (1991) (arguing that the post-war American occupation of Japan was not a
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1907 provides the vague guidance that an occupation exists when a
territory "is actually placed under the authority of the hostile
army. ' 210 As Oppenheim has observed, this definition is "not at all
precise, but it is as precise as a legal definition of... occupation can
be." 211
Regardless of the circumstances that actually trigger the body of
customary and conventional practice concerning military occupation,
the rules themselves evince the powerful influence of the Lockean
notion of property. Running throughout these rules is a tremendous
respect for the sanctity of private property-a conviction that such
rights are immune to any changes in government as an occupation.21 2
At the same time, however, there is a cross-current running through
the rules. The "military necessity" exceptions to most of these rules
reflect a more modern, positivistic notion that property rights-as a
creation of the state-can be subordinated to the state's interests.
A. RESPECT FOR PRIVATE PROPERTY: CUSTOMARY PRACTICE
The fundamental sanctity of private property under the rules of
military occupation derives from the understanding that, although
belligerent occupation affects a temporary transfer of partial sover-
eignty over the occupied territory from the de jure sovereign to the
occupying power, occupation alone does not transfer permanent sov-
ereignty to the occupant. Only a treaty of cession or "possession so
long and permanent, as should afford conclusive proof, that the ter-
ritory was altogether abandoned by its sovereign" can produce a
change in sovereignty.2 3 Implicit in the notion of occupation, there-
traditional "belligerent occupation" because hostilities had ceased prior to the oc-
cupation).
210. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, annex art. XLII, 36 Stat. 2306, T.I.A.S. No. 539, 99 U.N.T.S. 149 [herein-
after Hague Convention].
211. 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, at 167.
212. As was the case with the doctrine of acquired rights and the recognition of
property rights in terra nullius, Anglo-American practice and commentary pro-
vides the most consistent and emphatic defense of private property rights under
military occupation. See WESTLAKE, supra note 15, at 246 ("[T]he leaning of
writers in England and the United States is towards greater mildness than seems to
prevail on the continent.").
213. United States v. Hayward, 26 F.Cas. 240, 246 (1815); see also id. at 246(" The right which existed was the mere right of superior force, the allegiance was
temporary, and the possession not that firm possession, which gives to the con-
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fore, is the understanding that the occupant's control is only provi-
sional.
214
As a result, an occupation only transfers to the occupying power a
temporary authority to exercise some of the powers of a sovereign,
principally those necessary to maintain public order and to support
the war efforts of the occupying power.2 5 As the United States Su-
preme Court observed:
The right to thus occupy an enemy's country and temporarily provide for
queror plenum dominium et utile, the complete and perfect ownership of prop-
erty.") (emphasis added); Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch)
191, 195 (1815) ("[A]cquisitions made during war are not considered as perma-
nent until confirmed by treaty."); United States v. Rice, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 246,
254 (1819); American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 511, 542 (1828) ("The
usage of the world is... to consider the holding of conquered territory as a mere
military occupation, until its fate shall be determined at the treaty of peace."); Ho
Tung & Co. v. United States, 42 Ct. Cl. 213, 227-28 (1907); 1 PAUL FAUCHILLE,
TRAITE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 763-66 (1925); JENNINGS, supra note
115, at 52; TWISS, supra note 23, at 227 ("[I]t is not the superior power of the
conqueror which gives right to his conquest, but it is the consent of the con-
quered."); I OPPENHEIM, supra note 2, at 518-19 ("Conquest alone does not ipso
facto make the conquering State the sovereign of the conquered territory ....
Conquered enemy territory, although actually in possession and under the sway of
the conqueror, remains legally under the sovereignty of the enemy until through
annexation it comes under the sovereignty of the conqueror."); GERHARD VON
GLAHN, THE OCCUPATION OF ENEMY TERRITORY 31-33 (1957) (noting that it is
established that the rights and the sovereignty of the legitimate government are
suspended only when they conflict with the stronger power of the occupant during
the period of actual occupation). But see id at 38 & n.35 (noting that the occupant
is the dejure sovereign of an occupied territory).
214. But see Adam Roberts, Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-
Occupied Territories Since 1967, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 44 (1990) (arguing that sev-
eral instances of prolonged occupations, particularly the Israeli occupation of the
West Bank and Gaza, challenge the assumption that occupations are of short dura-
tion).
215. See, e.g., WAR DEP'T, RULES OF LAND WARFARE 73-74 (1940) quoted in 6
HACKWORTH, supra note 64, at 385 ("[M]ilitary occupation confers upon the in-
vading force the right to exercise control for the period of occupation. It does not
transfer the sovereignty to the occupant, but simply the authority or power to exer-
cise some of the rights of sovereignty."); see also 6 HACKWORTH, supra note 64,
at 385-88 (providing additional examples where no transfer of sovereignty oc-
curred); 7 MOORE, supra note 98, at 257-65; 1 MOORE, supra note 98, at 46-48
(discussing the rights of the military occupant); Hague Convention, supra note
210, annex art. XLIII (noting that once power comes withing the occupant's
hands, the occupant "shall take all measures in his power to restore, and ensure, so
far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely pre-
vented, the laws in force in the country").
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its government has been recognized by previous action of the executive
authority, and sanctioned by frequent decisions of this court. The local
government being destroyed, the conqueror may set up its own authority
and make rules and regulations for the conduct of temporary government
216
Because of the transitory nature (in a legal, if not always temporal
sense) of the occupying power's authority over the territory, scholars
often describe the status of the occupying country as that of a usu-
fructuary.217 In other words, the occupying power may administer the
territory-including, levying taxes and requisitioning supplies2 I--so
as to maintain order and provide for the needs of the inhabitants and
the occupying forces, but it must respect and safeguard the underly-
ing legal status quo. In particular, the temporary sovereign must re-
spect the existing property rights of the population.2 9
As suggested by Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Percheman,
this protection of private property during a belligerent occupation
216. MacLeod v. United States, 229 U.S. 416, 425 (1913) (citing Dooley v.
United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); City of New Orleans v. Steamship Co., 87
U.S. (20 Wall.) 387 (1874); Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 164 (1853);
Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603 (1850)) (emphasis added).
217. See Sayre, supra note 36, at 494 & n.26; Hague Convention, supra note
210, annex art. LV ("The occupying State shall be regarded only as administrator
and usufructuary."); WILLIAM BUCKLAND, A TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW 269
(Peter Stein ed., 3d ed. 1966) (noting that the concept of "usufruct" evolved from
the Roman Civil Law doctrine of "usufructus" which "was the right to enjoy the
property of another and to take the fruits, but not to destroy it, or fundamentally
alter its character").
218. See Hague Convention, supra note 210, arts. 49, 52; see also 7 MOORE,
supra note 98, at 280-87; 1 MOORE, supra note 98, at 47 (citing Cross v. Harrison,
57 U.S. (16 How.) 164, 190 (1853); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222, 230
(1901).
219. See Hague Convention, supra note 210, arts. 46-47; Mrs. Alexander's
Cotton, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 404, 419 (1864) ("This rule, as to property on land...
may now be regarded as substantially restricted 'to special cases dictated by the
necessary operation of war,' and as excluding, in general, 'the seizure of the pri-
vate property of pacific persons."') (citation omitted); see also 1 MOORE, supra
note 98, at 47-48 (discussing General Butler's proclamation at New Orleans that
"a conqueror has a right to displace the pre-existing authority and to assume...
all the powers and functions of government"); 7 MOORE, supra note 98, at 273-75
(discussing the treatment of the inhabitants); I OPPENHEIM, supra note 2, at 521-
22; VON GLAHN, supra note 213, at 194-95; Jacob Elon Conner, The Development
of the Law of Belligerent Occupation, 4 U. IOWA STUD. IN SoC., ECON., POL. &
HIST. 3, 33 (1912).
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enjoys a long tradition in international law.20 Hugo Grotius captured
this notion at the very foundation of modem international law. Con-
cemed by the violence and chaos that he witnessed in Europe during
the Thirty Year's War, he wrote his De Jure Belli ac Pacis in order
to moderate belligerent practice. 22' Grotius admonished belligerents
to respect the property of private individuals and not to capture the
property of enemy subjects in order to punish their monarchs.m
Vattel's Law of Nations refined this precept, admonishing that the
"conqueror seizes on the possessions of the state, the public prop-
erty, while private individuals are permitted to retain theirs."' Vat-
tel rejected the notion "that the conqueror is absolute master of his
conquest, that he may dispose of it as his property-that he may treat
it as he pleases" as a "monstrous principle" that "reduce[s] men to
the state of transferable goods, or beasts of burden." "
A more recent statement of these Lockean notions of property ap-
pears in Oppenheim's International Lmv: "Immovable private en-
emy property may under no circumstances or conditions be appropri-
ated by an invading belligerent. Should he confiscate and sell private
land or buildings, the buyer would acquire no right whatever to the
property."'  Oppenheim's opinion echoes that of Pasquale Fiore
who "goes so far as to say categorically that modem international
law uniformly recognizes the inviolability of private property. He ar-
gues that since private property is inviolable by the law of nature, it
220. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 86-87 ("j[I]t is very un-
usual, even in cases of conquest for the conqueror to do more than to displace the
sovereign and assume dominion over the country .... If this be the modem rule,
even in cases of conquest, who can doubt its application to the case of an amicable
cession of territory.").
221. See GROTIUS, supra note 16, at 20 ("I have had many and weighty reasons
for undertaking to write on this subject. Throughout the Christian world I observed
a lack of restraint in relation to war, such as even barbarous races should be
ashamed of."); see also I THOMAS A. WALKER, A HISTORY OF THE LAW OF
NATIONS § 142, at 284-85 (1899).
222. See GROTIUS, supra note 16, at 758.
223. VATrEL, supra note 6, at 388.
224. Id
225. 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, at 403; see also VON GLAHN, supra note 213,
at 186 ("[I]n no case may the occupant dispose of such immovable property, even
if the proceeds of a sale are to be handed over to the owners at the conclusion of
the war.").
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cannot lose its inviolability by the fact of war." 22 6
European and American courts long recognized such statements as
declaratory of a customary international rule obliging belligerents to
respect private property. In affording such protection to private prop-
erty, the courts often gave expression to the Lockean notion of prop-
erty as somehow more fundamental and sanctified than sovereignty.
For example, in a case arising out of the United States occupation of
New Mexico during the Mexican-American War of 1846-1848, the
United States Supreme Court observed that "although the former
political relations of the inhabitants were dissolved, their private re-
lations, their rights vested under the Government of their former al-
legiance... remained in full force and unchanged."
227
Similarly, in a case arising from the Philippine Insurgency which
followed the conquest of those islands by the United States during
the Spanish-American War, the United States Court of Claims, held
that "[t]he military occupancy, though absolute and supreme, oper-
ated only upon the political conditions of the people without affect-
ing private rights of person and property." 22' As a result, the plain-
tiffs were entitled to compensation for the United States Army's
226. DORIS A. GRABER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF BELLIGERENT
OCCUPATION (1863-1914): A HISTORICAL SURVEY 196 (1949) (citing 2 PASQUALE
FIORE, NOUVEAU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 302-04 (1869)).
227. Leitensdorfer v. Houghton, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 176, 177-78; see also Cross
v. Harrison, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 164, 190 (1853). In Ochoa v. Hernandezy Mora-
les, 230 U.S. 139 (1913), a case arising out of the United States' occupation of
Puerto Rico during the Spanish American War, the United States Supreme Court
ruled that an order by the American Military Governor violated international law.
The Court observed that "our Government, by its military forces, in the occupation
and control of Porto Rico as a colony of Spain [was] bound by the principles of
international law to do whatever was necessary to secure.., the guaranties of pri-
vate property." Id. at 159. The Court relied extensively on President McKinley's
instructions for the occupation which contained similar declarations of an interna-
tional obligation to respect the private property of the local population:
[T]he municipal laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights of person
and property... are considered as continuing in force ... and in practice they are not
usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the or-
dinary tribunals, substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened
practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.
Id. at 155 & n. 1. "Under this changed condition of things the inhabitants... are
entitled to security in their private rights and relations." Id.
228. Philippine Sugar Estates Dev. Co. v. United States, 39 Ct. Cl. 225, 246-47
(1904) (citing Percheman and its progeny).
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seizure of their property. The court grounded its decision on the
customary notion that "[a]ny other rule would . . . lead to results
harmful to the inhabitants.... something that has not been tolerated
in modem times.""
As several commentators have observed, the emergence of these
extensive protections for private property coincided with the domi-
nance of the "politico-economic doctrines of laissez-faire, and of the
separation of the spheres of politics and economics during the ex-
panding industrialization of the West."" 0 It is no coincidence that
several of the principal authors on the laws of war during the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries, such as Vattel and Grotius, were also
exponents of the natural rights theory of property. In contrast to the
positivistic view of property as an artifact of the state, the general
idea underlying the rules of military occupation is that private prop-
erty (as a natural institution) is distinct from sovereignty and contin-
ues to exist even when sovereignty has been destroyed.
B. CODIFICATION: THE HAGUE AND GENEVA CONVENTIONS
The customary understanding that private property must be re-
spected during a military occupation was codified in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries in a series of famous conventions. The
most famous of these codifications is Article 46 of the annex to the
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, which explicitly states that
"private property cannot be confiscated."" The article also man-
dates that "[f]amily honour and rights, the lives of persons, and pri-
vate property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must be
229. Id at 247; see also Philippine Sugar Estates Dev. Co. v. United States, 40
CL Cl. 33 (1904).
230. JuLiUs STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 727 (Stev-
ens ed., 1959).
231. Hague Convention, supra note 210, annex art. 46. The Hague Convention
of 1899-of which the 1907 Hague Convention was basically a restatement-
contained a similar prohibition. See Convention with Respect to the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, art. 46, 32 Stat. 1822, 98 U.N.T.S. 93. As
von Glahn notes, the Conference participants generally accepted these provisions
as codifications of pre-existing customary practice: "Little question existed by the
time of the First Hague Conference (1899) that private property could not be con-
fiscated by an invader under ordinary conditions, and the two relevant articles of
the Hague Regulations (46 & 47) did not encounter opposition at either Hague
meeting." VON GLAHN, supra note 213, at 185.
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respected," while Article 47 prohibits pillage.232 During the Nurem-
berg trials, the International Military Tribunal declared that the
"rules laid down in the Convention were recognized by all civilized
nations, and were regarded as being declaratory of the laws and cus-
toms of war., 233 At least since then, scholars have viewed the Hague
Conventions as embodying customary international law.
23 4
After World War II, the Geneva Diplomatic Conference of 1949
produced four conventions on the conduct of war. Like the Hague
Conventions, legal scholars generally recognize these conventions as
declarations of customary international law, in large part because of
their nearly unanimous adoption.235 The fourth convention, the Con-
vention for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, de-
voted particular attention to occupied territory. Because the partici-
pants considered the Hague Convention's protections of property
more than adequate, however, the Geneva Conventions do not in-
clude as many explicit protections of private property. Instead, the
Geneva Conventions implicitly incorporate the protections of private
property enumerated in the Hague Conventions,236 adding only a few
supplemental provisions, such as Article 147, which forbids "exten-
sive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by mili-
tary necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly." 237 In addi-
232. Hague Convention, supra note 210, annex arts. 46-47.
233. Trial of German Major War Criminals, 1946, CMD. 6964, Misc. No. 12, at
65, quoted in Theodor Meron, The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law, 81
AM. J. INT'LL. 348, 359 (1987).
234. See Roberts, supra note 214, at 53 (citing 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG 497
(1948)). See generally Meron, supra note 233, at 358.
235. See generally Meron, supra note 233. As Meron points out, the Geneva
Conventions "are binding on even more states than the Charter of the United Na-
tions." Id. at 348.
236. See COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949:
GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN
TIME OF WAR 271 (Uhler & Coursier eds. 1958) ("Consequently the question of
the treatment of enemy private property in the territory of the belligerent is still, in
general, governed by usage and by the Hague Regulations of 1907."); see also
Meron, supra note 233, at 364 & n.51; Eyal Benvenisti & Eyal Zamir, Private
Claims to Property Rights in the Future Israeli-Palestinian Settlement, 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 295, 303 & n.46 (1995).
237. Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, art. 147, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention]; see also id, arts. 27, 46, 50.
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tion, Article 49 of the Convention added a prohibition against estab-
lishing civilian settlements in occupied territories: "The Occupying
Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population
into the territory it occupies."" 8 This protection was particularly im-
portant in the controversy surrounding the Israeli occupation of the
West Bank and Gaza.2
Prior to the Hague and Geneva Conventions, the most famous
codification of the customary practice protecting private property
was the Lieber Code, which the Union army adopted during the
American Civil War at the behest of President Lincoln. 4  Although
legally binding only on the Union army, the instructions are consid-
238. Geneva Convention, supra note 237, art. 49.
239. The occupation in recent decades has been the prolonged Israeli occupation
of the Gaza strip, Golan Heights, Sinai Peninsula, and West Bank. The application
of the norms of military occupation to these occupied territories has often engen-
dered vitriolic debate. See, e.g., Craig Jackson, Israeli West Bank Settlements, The
Reagan Administration's Policy Toward the Middle East and International Law,
79 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 217 (1985) (reporting a rather acrimonious panel
discussion hosted by the American Society of International Law) [hereinafter West
Bank]; Michael Curtis, International Law and the Territories, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J.
457 (1991) (responding to Richard A. Falk & Bums H. Weston, The Relevance of
International Law to Palestinian Rights in the West Bank and Gaza: In Legal De-
fense of the Intifada, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 129 (199 1).
Of course, the Israeli occupation of several of these regions is over, notwith-
standing the continued controversy surrounding the 1994 transfer of control over
the Gaza strip and several villages in the West Bank to the Palestinian Authority.
See Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area, May 4, 1994, Isr.-P.L.O., 33
I.L.M. 662. In 1974, pursuant to the Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreement, Is-
rael withdrew from all of the Golan regions it had occupied during the 1973 war
and some areas it had occupied since the 1967 war. See Agreement on Disen-
gagement, May 31 and June 5, 1974, Isr.-Syria, 13 I.L.M. 880. The return of the
Sinai to Egypt was, of course, a result of the famous Camp David Accords. See
Treaty of Peace, Mar. 26, 1979, Isr.-Egypt, U.N. Doc. S!l 1302/Add. 1-3, 18
I.L.M. 362. The two countries resolved the status of the small disputed area around
Taba in 1989. See Agreements Regarding the Permanent Boundary, Feb. 26, 1989,
Isr.-Egypt, 28 I.L.M. 611.
240. See Instructions for the Government of the United States in the Field, April
24, 1863 [hereinafter Lieber Code], reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFUCTS
3-23 (Deitrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds, 1981) [hereinafter ARMED CONFUCTS].
Other oft-cited attempts to delineate the rules of belligerent occupation prior to the
Hague Conventions include the Oxford Manual of 1880, reprinted in supra at 35,
and the 1874 Declaration of Brussels, reprinted in supra at 25; see also Theodor
Meron, Shakespeare's Hemy the Fifth and the Law of War, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 &
n.89 (1992) (discussing Henry V's Ordinances of War, promulgated in 1419 dur-
ing the Hundred Years War with France).
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ered to have embodied the contemporaneous customs and laws re-
garding land warfare.24' Unlike public property, which the "victori-
ous army appropriates... and sequesters for its own benefit or that
of its government," 24 2 the Code mandated that "[p]rivate property,
unless forfeited by crimes or by offenses of the owner, can be seized
only by way of military necessity." 243 Following the example of the
United States, several European countries adopted similar manuals
regulating the conduct of military occupations and providing general
protection for private property-a process of codification which
eventually climaxed with the Hague and Geneva Conventions of this
century.
244
Though not always obeyed with punctilious respect, the Conven-
tions' provisions for the protection of private property continue to
exert tremendous influence on international practice. The Statute of
the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, for example,
grants the Tribunal jurisdiction to prosecute persons committing
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions including "extensive de-
struction and appropriation of property." '245
The Conventions' protection of private property has even at times
constrained the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, which
is generally in violation of the Geneva and Hague Conventions. For
example, in several cases, the Israeli Supreme Court has heard chal-
lenges under Article 44 of the Hague Conventions to Israeli policies
in the occupied territories. 46 On at least one occasion, the Court has
even held that a proposed settlement in the territories was illegal un-
der these Conventions. 47
241. See ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 240, at 3.
242. Lieber Code, supra note 240, art. 31.
243. Id. art. 38.
244. Conner, supra note 219, at 61.
245. Statute of the International Tribunal, arts. 1, 2(d) (published as the Annex
to the Secretary-General's Report on Aspects of Establishing an International Tri-
bunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Inter-
national Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia,
May 3, 1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1192.
246. See, e.g., Jamayat Iscaan v. Commander of I.D.F. Forces in the Judea and
Samaria Region, 37(4) H.C. 393 (1982); Abu Aita Case, 37(2) P.D. 197 (1983);
see also Benevenisti & Zamir, supra note 236, at 307-08 (arguing that the "Israeli
military government handles [abandoned property in the occupied territories] in
accordance with the rules of occupation.").
247. See Dweikat v. Government of Israel, 34(l) P.D. 1 (1980); see also Rob-
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C. POSITIVISTIC LIMITS ON THE SANCTITY OF PROPERTY
As with the doctrine of acquired rights, however, the law of bellig-
erent occupation has not completely immunized private property
from seizure by an occupying power. Reflecting a more conventional
notion of property, several "writers like Halleck and Dana... be-
lieve that the protection of private property is an act of grace by the
occupant who has the right to take private property, either in the form
of requisitions, contributions, taxes, and fines, or in other forms he
may choose." 4 ' Even writers who view property as entitled to
greater sanctity, generally acknowledge the power of a state, in cer-
tain circumstances, to requisition private property when necessary for
their war effort.
As a result, the law governing military occupation, is "a true com-
promise between the exigencies of the standard of civilization and
the necessities of war," evincing a Janus-like nature-simultane-
ously declaring the sanctity of property and yet sanctioning viola-
tions of these very rights.249 For example, the Geneva Convention's
general prohibition against "extensive destruction and appropriation
of property." includes the exception: unless "justified by military
erts, supra note 214, at 90 ("It was on the basis of Article 52 of the Hague Regu-
lations... that the Supreme Court, in its famous judgment of October 22, 1979, in
the Elon Moreh case, declared an Israeli civilian settlement near Nablus in the
West Bank to be illegal").
Although Israel is not a signatory to the Hague Conventions, the Israeli Supreme
Court has recognized these conventions as declaratory of customary international
law and, hence, binding on the Israeli occupation. See Ayub v. Minister of De-
fense, 33(2) P.D. 113 (1978); Comments of Professor W. Thomas Mallison, re-
printed in West Bank, supra note 239, at 227; Roberts, supra note 214, at 63.
248. GRABER, supra note 226, at 196. As the role of government has grown
during the twentieth century (with the simultaneous emergence of an increasingly
positivistic perspective of property), the traditional protections afforded private
property have come under increased stress. See, e.g., Davis P. Goodman, Note,
The Need for Fundamental Change in the Lmv of Belligerent Occupation, 37
STAN. L. REV. 1573, 1590-93 (1985); Elyce D. Santerre, From Confiscation to
Contingency Contracting: Property Acquisition on or Near the Battlefield, 124
MIL. L. REV. 111, 115 (1989) (noting that it is increasingly difficult to distinguish
between private and public property).
249. SCHVARZENBERGER, supra note 139, at 204; see also voN GLAHN, supra
note 213, at 227 C'Article 23(g) of the Hague Regulations of 1907 supplies an ex-
cellent example of the compromise solution which has been produced by the recur-
ring conflict between the humanitarian tendencies of international law and the
stern realities of warfare.").
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necessity."25 ° Similarly, Article 23 of the Hague Conventions de-
clares that "[i]t is especially forbidden•., to destroy or seize the en-
emy's property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively
demanded by the necessities of war." 
21
Treatises on this subject are replete with such contradictory sen-
tences: "As regards their property, [the local inhabitants] are entitled
to immunity from pillage, but they must submit to its appropriation
by an invading force, both in the form of goods, under the name of
requisitions, and in that of money, under the name of contribu-
tions. 212
Cases involving the seizure of property in occupied territory often
exhibit similar inconstancy, making paeans to the sanctity of private
property at one instant and appeals to the exigencies of military op-
erations the next. The United States Supreme Court opinion in
United States v. Russell,253 for example, begins with a panegyric to
the principle that "[p]rivate property... shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation."254 As a bulwark against tyranny and
oppression, "it is clear that there are few safeguards ordained in the
fundamental law against oppression and the exercise of arbitrary
power of more ancient origin or of greater value."2 5 The Supreme
Court acknowledges, however, that "the power of the government..
. to supply for the moment the public wants" may at times supersede
any individual's property interest and that "[e]xtraordinary and un-
foreseen occasions arise ... in which private property may be im-
pressed into the public service, or may be seized and appropriated to
the public use, or may even be destroyed without the consent of the
250. Geneva Convention, supra note 237, art. 147; see also Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 18, T.I.A.S. No.
3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (permitting the confiscation of "arms" and "horses" (in-
terpreted to include any form of transportation), even if privately owned, without
compensation). The Hague Convention permits the seizure of a similarly broad
category of war materials, although, unlike the Geneva Convention, it requires the
state to compensate the owners. See Hague Convention, supra note 210, annex art.
53; Elihu Lauterpacht, The Hague Regulations and the Seizure of Munitions de
Guerre, 32 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 218 (1955).
251. Hague Convention, supra note 210, annex art. 23(g) (emphasis added).
252. WESTLAKE, supra note 15, at 245.
253. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 623 (1871).
254. Id. at 627.
255. Id.
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owner."
256
The tension between these competing views of property is par-
ticularly evident in the grant to occupants, both under customary law
and the Hague Conventions, of authority to levy taxes and requisi-
tionsY This grant of authority reflects a positivistic notion that the
state has fundamental control over all property rights and, hence, can
requisition property for the public good. At the same time, however,
the law of military occupation attempts to cabin this control in an at-
tempt to minimize the state's control over property. Thus, although
the norms of military occupation provide an occupying power with
considerable authority to procure supplies and finances, they also re-
strict its exercise to "such limitations that it may not savor of confis-
cation."" Under the legal regime that the Hague Conventions estab-
lished, these more specific requirements reinforce this admonition.
For example, requisitions "shall only be for the needs of the [occu-
pying] army or of the administration of the territory in question,""
and, in the case of requisitions of materials or services, the occupying
power must pay compensation.2"
This duty to pay compensation is the greatest restriction on a
state's unfettered ability to requisition property. The Hague Conven-
tions' requirements to this effect merely re-articulated existing cus-
tomary practice. American courts, for example, have created an im-
plied contractual obligation on the part of an occupant to compensate
256. Id at 627-28.
257. See supra note 218 and accompanying text (discussing the ability of an oc-
cupying power to administer a territory under the Hague Convention). The Lieber
code provided similarly broad authority to levy contributions and taxes. See
GRABER, supra note 226, at 193.
258. MacLeod v. United States, 229 U.S. 416, 426 (1913) (quoting an executive
order by President McKinley). The Court prefaced this quote by stating that Presi-
dent McKinley's statements "show that the President was sensible of and disposed
to conform the activities of our Government to the principles of international law
and practice." Id
259. Hague Convention, supra note 210, annex art. 49; see also id, annex art.
52 ("Requisitions in kind and services shall not be demanded from municipalities
or inhabitants except for the needs of the army of occupation."); MacLeod, 229
U.S. at 426 (" The moneys so collected are to be used for the purpose of paying the
expenses of government under the military occupation, such as the salaries of the
judges and the police, and for the payment of the expenses of the army.").
260. Hague Convention, supra note 210, annex art. 52 C' Contributions in kind
shall as far as possible be paid for in cash; if not, a receipt shall be given and the
payment of the amount due shall be made as soon as possible.").
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individuals for the seizure of their property.26" ' Similarly, a post-
World War I arbitration tribunal held that, although "[m]ilitary req-
uisitions are a form of expropriation for the public benefit [and a]s
such they are not prohibited by international law ... they are per-
mitted only subject to the duty of compensation."1 62 As the American
publicist, John Bassett Moore, summarized:
Private property may be taken by a military commander for public use, in
cases of necessity, or to prevent it from falling into the hands of the en-
emy, but the necessity must be urgent, such as will admit of no delay...
[and] the government is bound to make full compensation to the owner. 63
Thus, a Lockean attempt to insulate property from the state is ap-
parent even in the doctrine of military occupation, which, of the three
doctrines discussed in this paper, is the most influenced by the posi-
tivistic notion that the state can manipulate property rights for the
public good.
V. CONCLUSION
These restrictions on an occupant's power to seize private prop-
erty, like the recognition of property rights in terra nullius and the
protection of vested rights from changes of sovereignty, illustrate the
general sanctity enjoyed by private property under international law.
Underlying each doctrine is a common philosophical conviction that
property, as a natural institution, is fundamentally distinct from the
state.
As this article attempts to demonstrate, this conviction illustrates
the influence of the natural rights theory of property prevalent during
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when modem international
261. See United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 623, 629-30 (1871) (hold-
ing that where the state impresses private property into public use during an emer-
gency, such as in war, the government makes an implied promise to compensate
the owner); Philippine Sugar Estates Dev. Co. v. United States, 39 Ct. Cl. 225
(1904); Philippine Sugar Estates Dev. Co. v. United States, 40 Ct. Cl. 33 (1904).
262. Goldenberg & Sons (Roumania) v. Germany, abstracted in 4 I.L.R. (1927-
1928 Ann. Dig.) 542, 544; see also Ddmbtre Karmatzucas c. Etat allemand, VII
Recueil des d6cisions des Tribunaux Mixtes 17, 22, quoted in 6 HACKWORTH, su-
pra note 64, at 409.
263. 7 MOORE, supra note 98, at 287 (citing Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13
How.) 115, 134 (1851)).
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law was first articulated. Expostulated in the writings of such classic
publicists as Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf, Emmerich Vattel, and
Christian Woolf, this theory has had a dramatic impact on interna-
tional law's treatment of property. Viewing property as a natural,
pre-political institution, these publicists and the state practices that
they inspired had little difficulty treating property as more permanent
than governments or states and, thus, as immune from changes in
sovereignty (such as a state's acquisition of territory that was previ-
ously terra nullius or the military occupation of a conquered region).
A nineteenth and twentieth-century resurgence of a positivistic
image of property as an artificial construct of the state has led to an
increased recognition of the ability of the state to adjust property
rights. Nevertheless, as the three doctrines discussed in this paper
attest, international law continues to accept the general thesis of the
Lockean vision of property that "[s]overeignty and property being
distinct... there is no necessary reason why circumstances that af-
fect the one should have any influence upon the other." 6
264. LINDLEY, supra note 2, at 337.
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